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专家还是晦涩难懂?哲学家对知识的归因与其他所有学者不同。

Expert or Esoteric? Philosophers Attribute Knowledge Differently Than All Other Academics.

作者信息

Starmans Christina, Friedman Ori

机构信息

Department of Psychology, University of Toronto.

Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo.

出版信息

Cogn Sci. 2020 Jul;44(7):e12850. doi: 10.1111/cogs.12850.

DOI:10.1111/cogs.12850
PMID:32583918
Abstract

Academics across widely ranging disciplines all pursue knowledge, but they do so using vastly different methods. Do these academics therefore also have different ideas about when someone possesses knowledge? Recent experimental findings suggest that intuitions about when individuals have knowledge may vary across groups; in particular, the concept of knowledge espoused by the discipline of philosophy may not align with the concept held by laypeople. Across two studies, we investigate the concept of knowledge held by academics across seven disciplines (N = 1,581) and compare these judgments to those of philosophers (N = 204) and laypeople (N = 336). We find that academics and laypeople share a similar concept of knowledge, while philosophers have a substantially different concept. These experiments show that (a) in contrast to philosophers, other academics and laypeople attribute knowledge to others in some "Gettier" situations; (b) academics and laypeople are much less likely to attribute knowledge when reminded of the possibility of error, but philosophers are not affected by this reminder; and (c) non-philosophy academics are overall more skeptical about knowledge than laypeople or philosophers. These findings suggest that academics across a wide range of disciplines share a similar concept of knowledge, and that this concept aligns closely with the intuitions held by laypeople, and differs considerably from the concept of knowledge described in the philosophical literature, as well as the epistemic intuitions of philosophers themselves.

摘要

各个学科领域的学者都在追求知识,但他们获取知识的方法却大相径庭。那么,这些学者对于某人何时拥有知识是否也有不同的看法呢?最近的实验结果表明,关于个体何时拥有知识的直觉可能因群体而异;尤其是,哲学学科所支持的知识概念可能与普通人所持的概念不一致。在两项研究中,我们调查了七个学科领域的学者(N = 1581)所持的知识概念,并将这些判断与哲学家(N = 204)和普通人(N = 336)的判断进行比较。我们发现,学者和普通人拥有相似的知识概念,而哲学家的概念则大不相同。这些实验表明:(a)与哲学家不同,其他学者和普通人在某些“盖梯尔”情境中会将知识归因于他人;(b)当被提醒存在错误可能性时,学者和普通人将知识归因的可能性要小得多,但哲学家不受此提醒的影响;(c)非哲学学科的学者总体上比普通人或哲学家对知识更持怀疑态度。这些发现表明,广泛学科领域的学者拥有相似的知识概念,并且这一概念与普通人的直觉紧密相符,与哲学文献中所描述的知识概念以及哲学家自身的认知直觉有很大差异。

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