Butkus Matthew A
Department of Social Sciences, McNeese State University, Lake Charles, LA, USA.
Sci Eng Ethics. 2020 Oct;26(5):2427-2437. doi: 10.1007/s11948-020-00239-9.
Artificial moral agents raise complex ethical questions both in terms of the potential decisions they may make as well as the inputs that create their cognitive architecture. There are multiple differences between human and artificial cognition which create potential barriers for artificial moral agency, at least as understood anthropocentrically and it is unclear that artificial moral agents should emulate human cognition and decision-making. It is conceptually possible for artificial moral agency to emerge that reflects alternative ethical methodologies without creating ontological challenges or existential crises for human moral agents.
人工道德主体引发了复杂的伦理问题,这既涉及到它们可能做出的潜在决策,也涉及到塑造其认知架构的输入信息。人类认知与人工认知之间存在诸多差异,这些差异为人工道德主体设置了潜在障碍,至少从以人类为中心的理解角度来看是如此,而且尚不清楚人工道德主体是否应该模仿人类认知和决策。从概念上讲,有可能出现反映其他伦理方法的人工道德主体,而不会给人类道德主体带来本体论挑战或生存危机。