Department of Economics, Bowling Green State University, OH, United States.
Department of Economics, Lafayette College, PA, United States.
J Health Econ. 2020 Sep;73:102319. doi: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2020.102319. Epub 2020 May 18.
In 2007, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid restructured the diagnosis related group (DRG) system by expanding the number of categories within a DRG to account for complications present within certain conditions. This change allows for differential reimbursement depending on the severity of the case. We examine whether this change incentivized hospitals to upcode patients as sicker to increase their reimbursements. Using the National Inpatient Survey data from HCUP from 2005 to 2010 and three methods to detect the presence of upcoding, our most conservative estimate is an additional three percent of reimbursement is attributable to upcoding. We find evidence of upcoding in government, non-profit, and for-profit hospitals. We find spillover effects of upcoding impacting not only Medicare payers, but also private insurance companies as well.
2007 年,医疗保险和医疗补助服务中心通过扩大 DRG 内的类别数量,来针对特定条件下的并发症,对诊断相关组 (DRG) 系统进行了重构。这一改变允许根据病例的严重程度进行差别化报销。我们研究了这一改变是否促使医院将患者编码为更严重的疾病,以增加他们的报销。使用来自 HCUP 的国家住院患者调查数据(2005 年至 2010 年)以及三种检测编码升级的方法,我们最保守的估计是,编码升级使报销额增加了额外的 3%。我们发现了编码升级在政府、非营利和营利性医院中存在的证据。我们发现编码升级的溢出效应不仅影响了医疗保险支付者,也影响了私人保险公司。