Milkwaukee School of Engineering, Grohmann Museum 202, 304 E State St, Milwaukee, 53202, WI, United States.
Stud Hist Philos Sci. 2020 Aug;82:34-43. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2019.12.004. Epub 2019 Dec 16.
In this paper, I examine Cicero's oft-neglected De Divinatione, a dialogue investigating the legitimacy of the practice of divination. First, I offer a novel analysis of the main arguments for divination given by Quintus, highlighting the fact that he employs two logically distinct argument forms. Next, I turn to the first of the main arguments against divination given by Marcus. Here I show, with the help of modern probabilistic tools, that Marcus' skeptical response is far from the decisive, proto-naturalistic assault on superstition that it is sometimes portrayed to be. Then, I offer an extended analysis of the second of the main arguments against divination given by Marcus. Inspired by Marcus' second main argument, I formulate, explicate, and defend a substantive principle of scientific methodology that I call the "Ciceronian Causal-Nomological Requirement" (CCR). Roughly, this principle states that causal knowledge is essential for relying on correlations in predictive inference. Although I go on to argue that Marcus' application of the CCR in his debate with Quintus is dialectically inadequate, I conclude that De Divinatione deserves its place in Cicero's philosophical corpus, and that ultimately, its significance for the history and philosophy of science ought to be recognized.
在本文中，我考察了西塞罗经常被忽视的《论占卜》，这是一部探讨占卜实践合法性的对话录。首先，我对昆图斯提出的主要占卜论据进行了新的分析，强调了他使用两种逻辑上不同的论证形式的事实。接下来，我转向马库斯提出的第一个主要反占卜论据。在这里，我借助现代概率工具表明，马库斯的怀疑主义回应远非有时被描绘的那样，是对迷信的决定性、原自然主义攻击。然后，我对马库斯提出的第二个主要反占卜论据进行了扩展分析。受马库斯第二个主要论点的启发，我提出、阐明并捍卫了一个我称之为“西塞罗因果规律要求”（CCR）的实质性科学方法论原则。大致来说，这条原则指出，因果知识对于在预测推理中依赖相关性是必不可少的。尽管我继续论证马库斯在与昆图斯的辩论中对 CCR 的应用在辩证上是不充分的，但我得出结论，《论占卜》在西塞罗的哲学著作中应占有一席之地，其最终对科学史和科学哲学的意义应该得到承认。
