McKinney Jonathan
Departments of Philosophy and Psychology, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH, United States.
Front Psychol. 2020 Jul 29;11:1347. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01347. eCollection 2020.
The enactive and ecological approaches to embodied cognitive science are on a collision course. While both draw inspiration from similar views in psychology and phenomenology, the two approaches initially held seemingly contradictory views and points of focus. Early enactivists saw value in the ecological approach but insisted that the two schools remain distinct. While ecological psychology challenged the common foes of mental representation and mind-body dualism, it seemingly did so at the cost of the autonomy of the agent. This is evidence that the early enactive and ecological approaches told different stories about how agents and environments interact. Whereas the enactive approach broadly focuses on agency and the organism's resilience to environmental perturbations, the ecological approach insists that organisms are best understood in terms of the organism-environment system and at the ecological scale. Historically, this tension created space for harsh criticisms from both sides and for some ecological psychologists to dismiss enactivism altogether. Despite their differences, both approaches use dynamic systems theory to explain the interactions between embodied agents and the environment or contextual milieu in which they are embedded. This has led some scholars to focus on the complementary elements of each approach and argue that the two schools are allies, thus rejecting the historical disagreements between the two approaches and calling for an ecological-enactive synthesis. The attempts to synthesize the approaches are noteworthy and should be considered steps in the right direction but are potentially problematic. If the two schools are merely synthesized to some form of ecological-enactivism, then something of value from both approaches could be lost. This is analogous to the hasty comparison between two seemingly similar schools of thought found in early attempts at East-West comparative philosophy. I argue that the relationship between the enactive and ecological approaches is both complementary and contrary and is thus best understood in terms of complementarity. Given the complexity of complementarity I will unpack the notion in steps. I will begin with the exploration of analogous concepts in Japanese Philosophy and gradually build a lens through which both agent environment and ecological enactive complementarities can be understood.
具身认知科学的生成进路和生态进路正处于冲突之中。虽然二者都从心理学和现象学的相似观点中汲取灵感,但这两种进路最初持有看似矛盾的观点和关注点。早期的生成论者看到了生态进路的价值,但坚持认为这两个学派应保持 distinct。虽然生态心理学挑战了心理表征和身心二元论这些共同的对立面,但它这样做似乎是以牺牲主体的自主性为代价的。这表明早期的生成进路和生态进路讲述了关于主体与环境如何相互作用的不同故事。生成进路广泛关注能动性以及有机体对环境扰动的恢复能力,而生态进路则坚持认为,有机体最好从有机体 - 环境系统以及生态尺度的角度来理解。从历史上看,这种紧张关系为双方的严厉批评以及一些生态心理学家完全摒弃生成论创造了空间。尽管存在差异,但这两种进路都使用动态系统理论来解释具身主体与它们所嵌入的环境或情境背景之间的相互作用。这使得一些学者关注每种进路的互补元素,并认为这两个学派是盟友,从而摒弃了这两种进路之间的历史分歧,并呼吁进行生态 - 生成综合。对这些进路进行综合的尝试值得注意,应该被视为朝着正确方向迈出的步伐,但可能存在问题。如果这两个学派仅仅被综合成某种形式的生态 - 生成论,那么两种进路中某些有价值的东西可能会丢失。这类似于早期东西方比较哲学尝试中对两个看似相似的思想流派进行的草率比较。我认为生成进路和生态进路之间的关系既是互补的又是相反的,因此最好从互补性的角度来理解。鉴于互补性的复杂性,我将逐步剖析这个概念。我将从探索日本哲学中的类似概念开始,逐步构建一个视角,通过这个视角可以理解主体 - 环境互补性和生态 - 生成互补性。