Cheo Roland, Ge Ge, Godager Geir, Liu Rugang, Wang Jian, Wang Qiqi
Center for Economic Research, Shandong University, 27 Shanda Nanlu, Jinan, Shandong, 250100, P.R., China.
Department of Health Management and Health Economics, University of Oslo, P.O. Box 1089 Blindern, Oslo, 0317, Norway.
Health Econ Rev. 2020 Sep 24;10(1):33. doi: 10.1186/s13561-020-00290-z.
Health care systems in many countries are characterized by limited availability of provider performance data that can be used to design and implement welfare improving reforms in the health sector. We question whether a simple mystery shopper scheme can be an effective measure to improve primary care quality in such settings.
Using a randomized treatment-control design, we conducted a field experiment in primary care clinics in a Chinese city. We investigate whether informing physicians of a forthcoming mystery shopper audit influences their prescribing behavior. The intervention effects are estimated using conditional fixed-effects logistic regression. The estimated coefficients are interpreted as marginal utilities in a choice model.
Our findings suggest that the mystery shopper intervention reduced the probability of prescribing overall. Moreover, the intervention had heterogeneous effects on different types of drugs.
This study provides new evidence suggesting that announced performance auditing of primary care providers could directly affect physician behavior even when it is not combined with pay-for-performance, or measures such as reminders, feedback or educational interventions.
许多国家的医疗保健系统的特点是可用于设计和实施改善卫生部门福利改革的医疗服务提供者绩效数据有限。我们质疑简单的神秘顾客计划能否成为改善此类环境中初级保健质量的有效措施。
采用随机治疗对照设计,我们在中国一个城市的初级保健诊所进行了一项实地实验。我们调查告知医生即将进行的神秘顾客审计是否会影响他们的开药行为。使用条件固定效应逻辑回归估计干预效果。估计系数在选择模型中被解释为边际效用。
我们的研究结果表明,神秘顾客干预降低了总体开药的可能性。此外,干预对不同类型的药物有不同的影响。
本研究提供了新的证据,表明即使不与绩效薪酬或提醒、反馈或教育干预等措施相结合,宣布对初级保健提供者进行绩效审计也可能直接影响医生的行为。