Alcenat Stéphane, Maréchal François, Naegelen Florence
Univ. Bourgogne Franche-Comté, CRESE EA3190, 25000, Besançon, France.
Int J Health Econ Manag. 2021 Mar;21(1):81-97. doi: 10.1007/s10754-020-09290-2. Epub 2020 Nov 17.
This paper analyzes the decision of a health authority to implement personalized medicine. We consider a model in which the health authority has three possibilities. It can apply either the same treatment (a standard or a new treatment) to the whole population or implement personalized medicine, i.e., use genetic information to offer the most suitable treatment to each patient. We first characterize the drug reimbursement contract of a firm producing a new treatment with a companion genetic test when the firm can undertake an effort to improve drug quality. Then, we determine the conditions under which personalized medicine should be implemented when this effort is observable and when it is not. Finally, we show how the unobservability of effort affects the conditions under which the health authority implements personalized medicine.
本文分析了卫生当局实施个性化医疗的决策。我们考虑一个模型，其中卫生当局有三种可能性。它可以对全体人群应用相同的治疗方法（标准治疗或新治疗方法），或者实施个性化医疗，即利用基因信息为每位患者提供最合适的治疗。我们首先描述了一家生产新治疗方法并配有配套基因检测的公司在能够努力提高药品质量时的药品报销合同。然后，我们确定在努力可观察和不可观察的情况下实施个性化医疗的条件。最后，我们展示了努力的不可观察性如何影响卫生当局实施个性化医疗的条件。
