Yale School of Medicine, New Haven, Connecticut, USA.
J Med Philos. 2020 Nov 30;45(6):663-682. doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhaa021.
This paper addresses the role of categories and dimensions in the classification of psychopathology. While psychopathology does not sort itself out neatly into natural categories, we do find rough, symptom-based groupings that, through refinement, become diagnostic categories. Given that these categories suffer from comorbidity, uncertain boundaries, and excessive "unspecified disorder" diagnoses, there has been a move toward refining the diagnoses with dimensional measures. The paper traces efforts both to improve the diagnostic categories with validators that allow at least partial validity and to introduce dimensional measures into the diagnostic manual. Drawing from the philosophical pragmatism of Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, which emphasizes the practical, effect-sensitive consequences of a theory along with an emphasis on empirical evidence and the progressive, probabilistic character of knowledge, the paper argues that these efforts must be guided both by scientific validity and clinical utility.
本文探讨了类别和维度在精神病理学分类中的作用。虽然精神病理学不能整齐地划分为自然类别,但我们确实发现了基于症状的大致分组,通过细化,这些分组成为了诊断类别。鉴于这些类别存在共病、边界不确定和过多的“未特指障碍”诊断,因此已经采取了一些措施来通过维度测量来细化这些诊断。本文追溯了努力提高诊断类别的有效性验证者的努力,这些验证者允许至少部分有效性,并将维度测量引入诊断手册。本文借鉴了查尔斯·桑德斯·皮尔士、威廉·詹姆斯和约翰·杜威的哲学实用主义,该理论强调理论的实际、敏感的影响后果,以及对经验证据和知识的渐进性、概率性的重视,本文认为,这些努力必须既受到科学有效性又受到临床实用性的指导。