Yao Kailing, Luo Yunpeng, Yang Yang, Liu Xin, Zhang Yuli, Yao Changhua
College of Communications Engineering, Army Engineering University, Nanjing 210007, China.
College of Information Science and Engineering, Guilin University of Technology, Guangxi 541000, China.
Entropy (Basel). 2018 Apr 20;20(4):302. doi: 10.3390/e20040302.
This article investigates the traffic offloading problem in the heterogeneous network. The location of small cells is considered as an important factor in two aspects: the amount of resources they share for offloaded macrocell users and the performance enhancement they bring after offloading. A location-aware incentive mechanism is therefore designed to incentivize small cells to serve macrocell users. Instead of taking the amount of resources shared as the basis of the reward division, the performance promotion brought to the macro network is taken. Meanwhile, in order to ensure the superiority of small cell users, the significance of them weighs heavier than macrocell users instead of being treated equally. The offloading problem is formulated as a Stackelberg game where the macro cell base station is the leader and small cells are followers. The Stackelberg equilibrium of the game is proved to be existing and unique. It is also proved to be the optimum of the proposed problem. Simulation and numerical results verify the effectiveness of the proposed method.
本文研究异构网络中的流量卸载问题。小小区的位置在两个方面被视为一个重要因素：它们为卸载的宏小区用户共享的资源量，以及卸载后带来的性能提升。因此，设计了一种位置感知激励机制来激励小小区为宏小区用户服务。不是以共享的资源量作为奖励分配的基础，而是以给宏网络带来的性能提升为依据。同时，为了确保小小区用户的优越性，小小区用户的重要性比宏小区用户更受重视，而不是平等对待。将卸载问题表述为一个斯塔克尔伯格博弈，其中宏小区基站是领导者，小小区是跟随者。证明了该博弈的斯塔克尔伯格均衡是存在且唯一的。还证明它是所提出问题的最优解。仿真和数值结果验证了所提方法的有效性。
