Xiao Kaiming, Zhu Cheng, Xie Junjie, Zhou Yun, Zhu Xianqiang, Zhang Weiming
Science and Technology on Information Systems Engineering Laboratory, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China.
Entropy (Basel). 2020 Aug 15;22(8):894. doi: 10.3390/e22080894.
Stealth malware is a representative tool of advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks, which poses an increased threat to cyber-physical systems (CPS) today. Due to the use of stealthy and evasive techniques, stealth malwares usually render conventional heavy-weight countermeasures inapplicable. Light-weight countermeasures, on the other hand, can help retard the spread of stealth malwares, but the ensuing side effects might violate the primary safety requirement of CPS. Hence, defenders need to find a balance between the gain and loss of deploying light-weight countermeasures, which normally is a challenging task. To address this challenge, we model the persistent anti-malware process as a shortest-path tree interdiction (SPTI) Stackelberg game with both static version (SSPTI) and multi-stage dynamic version (DSPTI), and safety requirements of CPS are introduced as constraints in the defender's decision model. The attacker aims to stealthily penetrate the CPS at the lowest cost (e.g., time, effort) by selecting optimal network links to spread, while the defender aims to retard the malware epidemic as much as possible. Both games are modeled as bi-level integer programs and proved to be NP-hard. We then develop a Benders decomposition algorithm to achieve the Stackelberg equilibrium of SSPTI, and design a Model Predictive Control strategy to solve DSPTI approximately by sequentially solving an 1+δ approximation of SSPTI. Extensive experiments have been conducted by comparing proposed algorithms and strategies with existing ones on both static and dynamic performance metrics. The evaluation results demonstrate the efficiency of proposed algorithms and strategies on both simulated and real-case-based CPS networks. Furthermore, the proposed dynamic defense framework shows its advantage of achieving a balance between fail-secure ability and fail-safe ability while retarding the stealth malware propagation in CPS.
隐形恶意软件是高级持续性威胁(APT)攻击的代表性工具,如今它对网络物理系统(CPS)构成了越来越大的威胁。由于采用了隐蔽和规避技术,隐形恶意软件通常会使传统的重量级对策失效。另一方面,轻量级对策有助于减缓隐形恶意软件的传播,但随之而来的副作用可能会违反CPS的主要安全要求。因此,防御者需要在部署轻量级对策的得失之间找到平衡,而这通常是一项具有挑战性的任务。为了应对这一挑战,我们将持续的反恶意软件过程建模为一个最短路径树拦截(SPTI)Stackelberg博弈,包括静态版本(SSPTI)和多阶段动态版本(DSPTI),并将CPS的安全要求作为约束条件引入防御者的决策模型中。攻击者旨在通过选择最优的网络链路以最低成本(如时间、精力) stealthily渗透CPS进行传播,而防御者旨在尽可能减缓恶意软件的传播。这两种博弈都被建模为双层整数规划,并被证明是NP难问题。然后,我们开发了一种Benders分解算法来实现SSPTI的Stackelberg均衡,并设计了一种模型预测控制策略,通过依次求解SSPTI的1+δ近似来近似求解DSPTI。通过在静态和动态性能指标上与现有算法和策略进行比较,进行了广泛的实验。评估结果证明了所提出的算法和策略在模拟的和基于实际案例的CPS网络上的效率。此外,所提出的动态防御框架在减缓CPS中隐形恶意软件传播的同时,显示出在实现故障安全能力和故障保护能力之间取得平衡的优势。