Department of Psychology, Utrecht University, The Netherlands.
Department of Psychology, Utrecht University, The Netherlands.
Conscious Cogn. 2021 Feb;88:103076. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103076. Epub 2021 Jan 20.
The experience of being an intentional agent is a key component of personal autonomy. Here, we tested how undermining intentional action affects the sense of agency as indexed by intentional binding. In three experiments using the Libet clock paradigm, participants judged the onset of their action (key presses) and resulting effect (auditory stimuli) under conditions of no, partial, or full autonomy over selecting and timing their actions. In all cases, we observed a moderate to strong intentional binding effect. However, we found no evidence for an influence of personal autonomy on intentional binding. These findings thus suggest that being unable to decide how and when to perform actions does not affect the perceived temporal binding between action and effect, a phenomenon suggested to be associated with the implicit sense of agency. We discuss the implications of our findings in the context of research on personal autonomy and goal-directed behavior.
作为一个有意图的行动者的体验是个人自主性的一个关键组成部分。在这里，我们测试了削弱有意行动如何影响作为代理索引的代理感。在三个使用 Libet 时钟范式的实验中，参与者在没有、部分或完全自主选择和定时其行动的情况下，对他们的行动（按键）和产生的效果（听觉刺激）的开始进行判断。在所有情况下，我们都观察到了中等至强的有意绑定效应。然而，我们没有发现个人自主性对有意绑定的影响的证据。因此，这些发现表明，无法决定如何以及何时执行行动并不会影响到行动和效果之间的感知时间绑定，这种现象被认为与隐含的代理感有关。我们在个人自主性和目标导向行为的研究背景下讨论了我们发现的意义。
