Egg Matthias
Institute of Philosophy, University of Bern, Laenggassstrasse 49, CH-3012 Bern, Switzerland.
Eur J Philos Sci. 2021;11(1):32. doi: 10.1007/s13194-020-00346-1. Epub 2021 Jan 30.
Existing proposals concerning the ontology of quantum mechanics (QM) either involve speculation that goes beyond the scientific evidence or abandon realism about large parts of QM. This paper proposes a way out of this dilemma, by showing that QM as it is formulated in standard textbooks allows for a much more substantive ontological commitment than is usually acknowledged. For this purpose, I defend a non-fundamentalist approach to ontology, which is then applied to various aspects of QM. In particular, I will defend realism about spin, which has been viewed as a particularly hard case for the ontology of QM.
现有的关于量子力学（QM）本体论的提议要么涉及超出科学证据的推测，要么放弃对量子力学大部分内容的实在论观点。本文提出了一种摆脱这一困境的方法，即表明标准教科书中所阐述的量子力学允许一种比通常所承认的更为实质性的本体论承诺。为此，我捍卫一种非原教旨主义的本体论方法，然后将其应用于量子力学的各个方面。特别是，我将捍卫关于自旋的实在论，自旋一直被视为量子力学本体论中一个特别棘手的案例。
