School of Economics and Management, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou 350108, China; Fujian Provincial Green Development Institute, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou 350108, China.
School of Economics and Management, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou 350108, China; Fujian Provincial Green Development Institute, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou 350108, China.
Waste Manag. 2021 Apr 1;124:325-338. doi: 10.1016/j.wasman.2021.02.012. Epub 2021 Feb 26.
Online recycling has become an increasingly popular research hotspot. However, few studies have focused on its potential service functions such as online promotion and offline recycling. In this study, considering such service functions, four models, namely, the manufacturer recycling channel (Model A), recycler recycling channel (Model B), online channel recycling (Model C) and manufacturer's self-built platform + recycling channel (Model D), are established, and derived the corresponding profit functions of supply chain members. Game theory was utilized to optimize service quality control strategies and supply chain member profits within the different models. Using numerical simulation, we examined the influence of both the upper recycling incentive limit and market demand on the optimal recycling channel strategies and profits. When the upper limit of the recovery incentive amount λ∈(0,3), the actual price and service quality to consumers under the manufacturer's self-built platform + recycling channel (Model D) are better than other channels, and the optimal manufacturer and online platform profits initially increased and then decreased with increases in the recycling incentive upper limit. We also found that the optimal recycler profit increased as the upper limit of the recycling incentive increased, and that optimal supply chain member profits increased when market size D∈(0,100).
在线回收已成为一个日益受到关注的研究热点。然而,很少有研究关注其潜在的服务功能,如在线推广和线下回收。在这项研究中,考虑到这些服务功能,建立了四个模型,即制造商回收渠道(模型 A)、回收商回收渠道(模型 B)、在线渠道回收(模型 C)和制造商自建平台+回收渠道(模型 D),并推导出了供应链成员的相应利润函数。利用博弈论优化了不同模型中的服务质量控制策略和供应链成员利润。通过数值模拟,考察了回收激励上限和市场需求对最优回收渠道策略和利润的影响。当回收激励金额上限λ∈(0,3)时,制造商自建平台+回收渠道(模型 D)下消费者的实际价格和服务质量优于其他渠道,制造商和在线平台的最优利润最初随回收激励上限的增加而增加,然后减少。还发现,随着回收激励上限的增加,最优回收商利润增加,而最优供应链成员利润则随市场规模 D∈(0,100)的增加而增加。