School of Business, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, China.
School of Systems Science, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China.
Chaos. 2021 Jan;31(1):013130. doi: 10.1063/5.0033335.
How long-term cooperation is maintained in a society is an important and interesting question. The evolutionary game theory is often used as the basic framework to study this topic. The social status of game participants has an important influence on individual decision-making. Enlightened by this thought, we present a classification imitation model where the mechanisms of the celebrity effect and incomplete egoism are presented. The celebrity effect is reflected in each strategy update process to probe how individual decision-making is dynamically adjusted by comparing the social status of both parties in the game. The incomplete egoism refers to the irrational imitation of celebrities while self-interest is ignored. With this model, the group cooperation decision-making mechanism led by celebrities is revealed. Large-scale Monte Carlo simulations show that the incomplete egoism of individuals cannot stimulate cooperation but guarantee the stable existence of cooperation. Furthermore, the scale-free and community structure of the network enables cooperation to spread widely and maintains long-term survival. Our conclusion might provide practically new insight into the understanding and controlling of cooperation in the complex social systems.
一个社会能够维持多长时间的长期合作是一个重要而有趣的问题。进化博弈论经常被用作研究这个主题的基本框架。游戏参与者的社会地位对个人决策有重要影响。受此思想启发，我们提出了一种分类模仿模型，其中呈现了名人效应和不完全利己主义的机制。名人效应体现在每个策略更新过程中，通过比较游戏中双方的社会地位，探究个体决策是如何动态调整的。不完全利己主义是指在忽视自身利益的情况下对名人的非理性模仿。通过这个模型，揭示了由名人主导的群体合作决策机制。大规模的蒙特卡罗模拟表明，个体的不完全利己主义不能刺激合作，但能保证合作的稳定存在。此外，网络的无标度和社区结构使得合作得以广泛传播并长期生存。我们的结论可能为理解和控制复杂社会系统中的合作提供新的实践见解。
