Faculty of Philosophy, Saint Paul University, Ottawa, ON, Canada.
Med Health Care Philos. 2021 Sep;24(3):351-366. doi: 10.1007/s11019-021-10009-4. Epub 2021 Mar 28.
As individuals grow older, they usually require assistance with the daily tasks of self-care. This type of assistance, ancillary care, is essential to maintaining the health of those who need these services. In his prudential lifespan account, Norman Daniels includes access to such services making his account an attractive proposal given the current demographic shift. In this paper, I examine the prudential lifespan account through the lens of old age and I focus on the two concepts on which the lifespan account relies. I show that these two concepts, normal species functioning and opportunity cannot buttress Daniels's lifespan account; at least it cannot do so for older persons. The tensions that I identify in the prudential lifespan account in relation to aging are instructive for the more recent proposals to include aging in a theory of health and health justice. In addition, my analysis allows me to demonstrate that Daniels's view of opportunity is irreconcilable to capabilities, the latter being more adaptable to the realities of aging. If capabilities appear more promising, it is nonetheless imperative that the specificities of extended care, such as the need for unpaid caregiving, be taken into consideration.
随着个体年龄的增长,他们通常需要他人协助完成日常生活自理任务。这种辅助性的护理对于维持那些需要此类服务人群的健康至关重要。在他的审慎寿命账户中,诺曼·丹尼尔斯(Norman Daniels)包括了对这些服务的获取,鉴于当前的人口结构变化,他的账户是一个有吸引力的提议。在本文中,我通过老年视角审视了审慎寿命账户,并关注了该账户所依赖的两个概念。我表明,这两个概念,即正常物种功能和机会,并不能支持丹尼尔斯的寿命账户;至少对于老年人来说是这样。我在与衰老相关的审慎寿命账户中发现的紧张关系,对于最近将衰老纳入健康和健康正义理论的提议具有启示意义。此外,我的分析使我能够证明,丹尼尔斯的机会观与能力不可调和,后者更能适应衰老的现实。如果能力看起来更有希望,但仍必须考虑到长期护理的特殊性,例如对无偿护理的需求。