IEEE/ACM Trans Comput Biol Bioinform. 2022 Jul-Aug;19(4):2345-2355. doi: 10.1109/TCBB.2021.3069380. Epub 2022 Aug 8.
Recent advances of microelectrode-dot-array (MEDA) based Biochips have revolutionized the application of Lab-on-chip devices. New techniques for MEDA based biochips confide on the concepts on computer-aided design automation and cyberphysical integration to provide ease of use, higher throughput and reliability. One of the major security concerns in MEDA based biochips is actuation tempering attacks targeted to change control sequence daisy chain input resulting in incorrect bioassays. In this paper, we attempted to identify different types of actuation tampering attacks specific to MEDA based biochips. We proposed one technique to detect errors in order to secure the biochips against actuation tempering attacks. This proposed technique is able to monitor such malicious operations and can stall it under any abnormality in operation. Our analysis proves that the proposed method is able to detect errors accurately and proves that this technique is naturally implemented in MEDA.
基于微电极点阵列 (MEDA) 的生物芯片的最新进展彻底改变了片上实验室设备的应用。基于 MEDA 的生物芯片的新技术依赖于计算机辅助设计自动化和网络物理集成的概念，以提供易用性、更高的吞吐量和可靠性。基于 MEDA 的生物芯片中的主要安全问题之一是针对更改控制序列菊花链输入的致动篡改攻击，从而导致不正确的生物测定。在本文中，我们试图确定针对基于 MEDA 的生物芯片的不同类型的致动篡改攻击。我们提出了一种检测错误的技术，以保护生物芯片免受致动篡改攻击。该技术能够监控此类恶意操作，并在操作异常时停止它。我们的分析证明，所提出的方法能够准确地检测错误，并证明该技术在 MEDA 中自然实现。
