Signorelli Camilo Miguel, Wang Quanlong, Khan Ilyas
Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford, 15 Parks Rd., Oxford OX1 3QD, UK.
Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, INSERM U992, NeuroSpin, 91191 Gif-sur-Yvette, France.
Entropy (Basel). 2021 Mar 5;23(3):308. doi: 10.3390/e23030308.
Scientific studies of consciousness rely on objects whose existence is assumed to be independent of any consciousness. On the contrary, we assume consciousness to be fundamental, and that one of the main features of consciousness is characterized as being other-dependent. We set up a framework which naturally subsumes this feature by defining a compact closed category where morphisms represent conscious processes. These morphisms are a composition of a set of generators, each being specified by their relations with other generators, and therefore co-dependent. The framework is general enough and fits well into a compositional model of consciousness. Interestingly, we also show how our proposal may become a step towards avoiding the hard problem of consciousness, and thereby address the combination problem of conscious experiences.
对意识的科学研究依赖于其存在被假定为独立于任何意识的对象。相反，我们假定意识是基本的，并且意识的主要特征之一被表征为是依赖于他者的。我们通过定义一个紧致闭范畴来建立一个自然包含这一特征的框架，其中态射代表意识过程。这些态射是一组生成元的复合，每个生成元都由它们与其他生成元的关系所规定，因此是相互依赖的。该框架足够通用，并且很好地契合了意识的组合模型。有趣的是，我们还展示了我们的提议如何可能成为迈向避免意识难题的一步，从而解决意识体验的组合问题。
