University of Cologne, Germany.
Pers Soc Psychol Bull. 2022 Aug;48(8):1298-1312. doi: 10.1177/01461672211040686. Epub 2021 Aug 29.
In Dictator Games, dictators decide how much of a given endowment to send to receivers with no further interactions. We explored the social inferences people draw about dictators from the dictators' money amount sent and vice versa in 11 experiments ( = 1,425): Participants rated "unfair" dictators, who sent little or no money, as more agentic, but less communal than "fair" dictators, who sent half of the endowment. Conversely, participants expected more agentic and conservative but less communal dictators to send less money than less agentic, more liberal, or more communal dictators. Participants also rated unfair dictators as less intelligent but expected less intelligent dictators to send more money. When participants played the Dictator Game with real money, only self-reported communion predicted the money amount sent. Thus, participants' inferences might not reflect reality, but rational social actors should not only fear to appear unfair but also unintelligent.
在独裁者博弈中,独裁者决定将给定的分配额分配给接收者,之后不再进行任何进一步的互动。我们通过 11 项实验(n=1425)来探索人们从独裁者发送的金额和相反方向对独裁者做出的社会推断:参与者认为只发送少量或不发送资金的“不公平”独裁者比发送一半分配额的“公平”独裁者更具权威性,但不那么具有社群意识。相反,参与者预期更具权威性和保守性但不那么具有社群意识的独裁者会比不那么具权威性、更自由或更具社群意识的独裁者发送更少的钱。参与者还认为不公平的独裁者不太聪明,但预期不太聪明的独裁者会发送更多的钱。当参与者用真钱玩独裁者博弈时,只有自我报告的社群意识预测了发送的金额。因此,参与者的推断可能并不反映现实,但理性的社会行为者不仅应该害怕显得不公平,还应该害怕显得愚蠢。