MacDougall D Robert
Kennedy Inst Ethics J. 2021;31(3):247-270. doi: 10.1353/ken.2021.0021.
Legal standards of disclosure in a variety of jurisdictions require physicians to inform patients about the likely consequences of treatment, as a condition for obtaining the patient's consent. Such a duty to inform is special insofar as extensive disclosure of risks and potential benefits is not usually a condition for obtaining consent in non-medical transactions.What could morally justify the physician's special legal duty to inform? I argue that existing justifications have tried but failed to ground such special duties directly in basic and general rights, such as autonomy rights. As an alternative to such direct justifications, I develop an indirect justification of physicians' special duties from an argument in Kant's political philosophy. Kant argues that pre-legal rights to freedom are the source of a duty to form a state. The state has the authority to conclusively determine what counts as "consent" in various kinds of transactions. The Kantian account can subsequently indirectly justify at least one legal standard imposing a duty to inform, the reasonable person standard, but rules out one interpretation of a competitor, the subjective standard.
在不同司法管辖区,法律规定的信息披露标准要求医生告知患者治疗可能产生的后果,以此作为获得患者同意的条件。这种告知义务具有特殊性,因为在非医疗交易中,广泛披露风险和潜在益处通常并非获得同意的条件。从道德层面来看,医生这种特殊的法律告知义务该如何解释呢?我认为,现有的解释试图将这种特殊义务直接建立在诸如自主权等基本和普遍权利之上,但并未成功。作为这种直接解释的替代方案,我从康德政治哲学的一个论点出发,对医生的特殊义务进行了间接解释。康德认为,法律产生之前的自由权利是形成国家的义务的来源。国家有权最终确定在各类交易中什么算作“同意”。康德的观点随后可以间接证明至少一项规定告知义务的法律标准是合理的,即理性人标准,但排除了对一个与之竞争的标准——主观标准的一种解释。