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基于 IEC 61850 的变电站自动化系统的拒绝服务攻击:智能变电站路径的关键网络威胁

Denial-of-Service Attack on IEC 61850-Based Substation Automation System: A Crucial Cyber Threat towards Smart Substation Pathways.

机构信息

School of Electrical Engineering Computing and Mathematical Sciences, Curtin University, Perth, WA 1987, Australia.

Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering, Higher Colleges of Technology, Sharjah 27272, United Arab Emirates.

出版信息

Sensors (Basel). 2021 Sep 26;21(19):6415. doi: 10.3390/s21196415.

DOI:10.3390/s21196415
PMID:34640735
原文链接:https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8512268/
Abstract

The generation of the mix-based expansion of modern power grids has urged the utilization of digital infrastructures. The introduction of Substation Automation Systems (SAS), advanced networks and communication technologies have drastically increased the complexity of the power system, which could prone the entire power network to hackers. The exploitation of the cyber security vulnerabilities by an attacker may result in devastating consequences and can leave millions of people in severe power outage. To resolve this issue, this paper presents a network model developed in OPNET that has been subjected to various Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to demonstrate cyber security aspect of an international electrotechnical commission (IEC) 61850 based digital substations. The attack scenarios have exhibited significant increases in the system delay and the prevention of messages, i.e., Generic Object-Oriented Substation Events (GOOSE) and Sampled Measured Values (SMV), from being transmitted within an acceptable time frame. In addition to that, it may cause malfunction of the devices such as unresponsiveness of Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs), which could eventually lead to catastrophic scenarios, especially under different fault conditions. The simulation results of this work focus on the DoS attack made on SAS. A detailed set of rigorous case studies have been conducted to demonstrate the effects of these attacks.

摘要

现代电网的混合扩展的产生促使人们利用数字基础设施。变电站自动化系统(SAS)、先进的网络和通信技术的引入,极大地增加了电力系统的复杂性,这可能使整个电网容易受到黑客攻击。攻击者利用网络安全漏洞可能会造成毁灭性的后果,可能导致数百万人严重停电。为了解决这个问题,本文提出了一种在 OPNET 中开发的网络模型,该模型已经受到了各种拒绝服务(DoS)攻击的影响,以展示基于国际电工委员会(IEC)61850 的数字变电站的网络安全方面。攻击场景显示系统延迟和消息(即通用面向对象的变电站事件(GOOSE)和采样测量值(SMV))的阻止显著增加,这些消息无法在可接受的时间内传输。此外,这可能导致设备出现故障,例如智能电子设备(IED)无响应,这可能最终导致灾难性场景,尤其是在不同的故障条件下。这项工作的仿真结果侧重于对 SAS 的 DoS 攻击。已经进行了详细的一组严格案例研究,以展示这些攻击的影响。

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