Lagerlöf Nils-Petter
Department of Economics, York University, Toronto, Canada.
J Econ Growth (Boston). 2021;26(2):113-152. doi: 10.1007/s10887-021-09188-9. Epub 2021 Mar 13.
This paper proposes a model of statehood, defined as elite extraction of resources from a subject population. Different from most of the existing literature, the size of the subject population evolves endogenously in a Malthusian fashion, and the elite take into account the effects on future population levels when taxing the current population. The elite can spend extracted resources by investing in productive and extractive capacities. Productive capacity increases the size of the pie, while extractive capacity makes it easier for the elite to tax it. Together-but not each on its own-these two types of investment can give rise to multiple steady-state equilibria, such that one steady state has both a higher rate of extraction, and higher population density and output, than the other steady state. The model can also account for a positive empirical relationship between land productivity and state antiquity among countries with relatively late state development.
The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10887-021-09188-9.
本文提出了一个国家形态模型，定义为精英阶层从臣民群体中提取资源。与大多数现有文献不同，臣民群体的规模以马尔萨斯方式内生演变，精英阶层在对当前人口征税时会考虑对未来人口水平的影响。精英阶层可以通过投资生产能力和榨取能力来使用提取的资源。生产能力增加了资源总量，而榨取能力使精英阶层更容易对其征税。这两种投资共同作用（而非各自单独作用）会产生多个稳态均衡，使得一种稳态的提取率更高，人口密度和产出也高于另一种稳态。该模型还可以解释国家发展相对较晚的国家中土地生产力与国家古老程度之间的正实证关系。
在线版本包含可在10.1007/s10887-021-09188-9获取的补充材料。
