China Academy of Corporate Governance, Nankai University, Nankai District, No. 94 Weijin Road, Tianjin, 300071, China.
Commercial College, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, No. 25 Zhujiang Road, Hexi District, Tianjin, 300221, China.
Environ Sci Pollut Res Int. 2022 Aug;29(40):61161-61177. doi: 10.1007/s11356-022-20220-2. Epub 2022 Apr 19.
As a polluting industry, the green transformation of coatings is highly concerned by the Chinese government. In order to explore the role of government in the process of green transformation of coating industry, this paper constructs a green governance evolutionary game model of "government-manufacturing companies-application companies," and the complex interaction mechanism among the three parties is studied. Then, the evolutionary game theory is used to analyze the asymptotic stability conditions and evolutionary stability strategies of the equilibrium point of the tripartite game in the three stages of green governance in the coating industry (traditional technology-green transformation-collaborative governance). Finally, the model was verified by numerical simulation, and the influence of the changes of subjective parameters on the evolutionary game was discussed. The results show that (1) the intensity of government governance is related to the frequency of spot checks and punishment coefficients, and the evolution tends to be balanced when the intensity of governance is moderate. (2) The evolutionary trend of the game's main players' strategy selection also depends on the government's punishment. There is greater probability of green transition of manufacturing companies under punishment. (3) The green subsidy coefficient and the green degree of the product also have a greater impact on the strategic choice of the game player.
作为一个污染产业,涂料行业的绿色转型受到了中国政府的高度关注。为了探讨政府在涂料行业绿色转型过程中的作用,本文构建了“政府-制造企业-应用企业”的绿色治理演化博弈模型,研究了三方之间的复杂相互作用机制。然后,运用演化博弈理论分析了涂料行业绿色治理三个阶段(传统技术-绿色转型-协同治理)中三方博弈平衡点的渐近稳定条件和演化稳定策略。最后,通过数值模拟对模型进行了验证,并讨论了主观参数变化对演化博弈的影响。结果表明:(1)政府治理强度与抽查频率和处罚系数有关,治理强度适中时演化趋于均衡。(2)游戏主要参与者策略选择的演化趋势也取决于政府的处罚,在处罚的情况下制造企业更有可能进行绿色转型。(3)绿色补贴系数和产品的绿色程度对游戏玩家的战略选择也有较大影响。
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