Wang Shaoyu, Huang Kaizhi, Xu Xiaoming, Hu Xiaoyan, Yang Jing, Jin Liang
Wireless Communication Technology Office, Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou 450002, China.
Entropy (Basel). 2022 Mar 30;24(4):488. doi: 10.3390/e24040488.
Authentication is a critical issue in wireless communication due to the impersonation and substitution attacks from the vulnerable air interface launched by the malicious node. There are currently two kinds of authentication research in wireless communication. One is based on cryptography and relies on computational complexity, the other is based on physical layer fingerprint and can not protect data integrity well. Both of these approaches will become insecure when facing attackers with infinite computing power. In this paper, we develop a wireless unconditional authentication framework based on one-time keys generated from wireless channel. The proposed unconditional authentication framework provides a new perspective to resist infinite computing power attackers. We study the performance of the unconditional authentication framework in this paper. First, a physical layer offered chain key (PHYLOCK) structure is proposed, which can provide one-time keys for unconditional authentication. The physical layer offered chain keys are generated by XORing the physical layer updated keys extracted from the current channel state information (CSI) and the previous chain keys. The security of PHYLOCK is analyzed from the perspective of information theory. Then, the boundary of the deception probability is conducted. It is shown that unconditional authentication can achieve a probability of deception 2-12Hk, where Hk is the entropy of the one-time key used for one message. Finally, the conditions for unconditional authentication are listed. Our analysis shows that the length of the key and the authentication code need to be twice the length of the message and the encoding rules of the authentication code need to satisfy the restrictions we listed.
由于恶意节点从易受攻击的空中接口发起的假冒和替换攻击，认证在无线通信中是一个关键问题。目前无线通信中有两种认证研究。一种基于密码学，依赖于计算复杂性，另一种基于物理层指纹，不能很好地保护数据完整性。当面对具有无限计算能力的攻击者时，这两种方法都会变得不安全。在本文中，我们基于从无线信道生成的一次性密钥开发了一种无线无条件认证框架。所提出的无条件认证框架为抵御无限计算能力攻击者提供了一个新的视角。在本文中，我们研究了无条件认证框架的性能。首先，提出了一种物理层提供的链密钥（PHYLOCK）结构，它可以为无条件认证提供一次性密钥。物理层提供的链密钥是通过对从当前信道状态信息（CSI）中提取的物理层更新密钥与先前的链密钥进行异或运算生成的。从信息论的角度分析了PHYLOCK的安全性。然后，确定了欺骗概率的边界。结果表明，无条件认证可以实现欺骗概率2-12Hk，其中Hk是用于一条消息的一次性密钥的熵。最后，列出了无条件认证的条件。我们的分析表明，密钥和认证码的长度需要是消息长度的两倍，并且认证码的编码规则需要满足我们列出的限制。
