Nagkoulis Nikolaos, Katsifarakis Konstantinos L
School of Civil Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, 541 24, Thessaloniki, Greece.
Ground Water. 2023 Jan;61(1):35-43. doi: 10.1111/gwat.13224. Epub 2022 Jul 18.
In this article, alternate pumping is studied as a means used to reduce the salinity concentration in coastal aquifers, pumped using a system of wells. This approach has been applied to a hypothetical confined coastal aquifer. Flow has been modeled, using SEAWAT. Two strategies are proposed based on cooperative game theory, to promote alternate pumping. In both strategies an external player will compensate the users that will pump during an unpopular pumping period. In the first strategy it is supposed that this external player aims at protecting a critical well, e.g. a municipal well, reducing its maximum salinity concentration by pumping alternately. In the second strategy proposed, the target is to reduce the overall salinity of the water pumped by the wells. In applying the cooperative game theory, the Shapley value is used to distribute the benefits of cooperation between the players (well users), according to their marginal contribution. Overall, well users can reduce sea water intrusion by cooperatively changing their pumping time schedules. The game theoretical model developed is a useful tool to promote cooperation toward this direction. The methods applied in the hypothetical aquifer, can be tested in actual aquifers to reduce sea water intrusion.
在本文中，交替抽水作为一种用于降低沿海含水层盐度浓度的方法进行了研究，该含水层通过一套井系统进行抽水。此方法已应用于一个假设的承压沿海含水层。利用SEAWAT对水流进行了建模。基于合作博弈论提出了两种促进交替抽水的策略。在这两种策略中，一个外部参与者将对在不受欢迎的抽水时段进行抽水的用户给予补偿。在第一种策略中，假定该外部参与者旨在保护一口关键井，例如市政井，通过交替抽水降低其最大盐度浓度。在提出的第二种策略中，目标是降低井抽出的水的总体盐度。在应用合作博弈论时，夏普利值用于根据参与者（井用户）的边际贡献在他们之间分配合作收益。总体而言，井用户可以通过合作改变他们的抽水时间表来减少海水入侵。所开发的博弈论模型是促进朝这个方向合作的有用工具。在假设含水层中应用的方法可在实际含水层中进行测试以减少海水入侵。
