Ardizzon Francesco, Crosara Laura, Laurenti Nicola, Tomasin Stefano, Montini Nicola
Department of Information Engineering, University of Padova, Via Gradenigo 6/A, 35131 Padova, Italy.
Qascom, Via Marinali 87, 36061 Bassano del Grappa, Italy.
Sensors (Basel). 2022 Aug 21;22(16):6298. doi: 10.3390/s22166298.
Global navigation satellite systems (GNSSs) provide accurate positioning and timing services in a large gamut of sectors, including financial institutions, Industry 4.0, and Internet of things (IoT). Any industrial system involving multiple devices interacting and/or coordinating their functionalities needs accurate, dependable, and trustworthy time synchronization, which can be obtained by using authenticated GNSS signals. However, GNSS vulnerabilities to time-spoofing attacks may cause security issues for their applications. Galileo is currently developing new services aimed at providing increased security and robustness against attacks, such as the open service navigation message authentication (OS-NMA) and commercial authentication service (CAS). In this paper, we propose a robust and secure timing protocol that is independent of external time sources, and solely relies on assisted commercial authentication service (ACAS) and OS-NMA features. We analyze the performance of the proposed timing protocol and discuss its security level in relation to malicious attacks. Lastly, experimental tests were conducted to validate the proposed protocol.
全球导航卫星系统(GNSS)在包括金融机构、工业4.0和物联网(IoT)在内的众多领域提供精确的定位和定时服务。任何涉及多个设备交互和/或协调其功能的工业系统都需要精确、可靠且值得信赖的时间同步,这可以通过使用经过认证的GNSS信号来实现。然而,GNSS易受时间欺骗攻击的特性可能会给其应用带来安全问题。伽利略系统目前正在开发新的服务,旨在提高针对攻击的安全性和鲁棒性,例如开放服务导航消息认证(OS-NMA)和商业认证服务(CAS)。在本文中,我们提出了一种健壮且安全的定时协议,该协议独立于外部时间源,仅依赖辅助商业认证服务(ACAS)和OS-NMA功能。我们分析了所提出的定时协议的性能,并讨论了其相对于恶意攻击的安全级别。最后,进行了实验测试以验证所提出的协议。