Ritunnano Rosa, Bortolotti Lisa
Institute for Mental Health, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT UK.
Philosophy Department and Institute for Mental Health, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT UK.
Phenomenol Cogn Sci. 2022;21(4):949-968. doi: 10.1007/s11097-021-09764-9. Epub 2021 Aug 23.
Delusions are often portrayed as paradigmatic instances of incomprehensibility and meaninglessness. Here we investigate the relationship between delusions and meaning from a philosophical perspective, integrating arguments and evidence from cognitive psychology and phenomenological psychopathology. We review some of the empirical and philosophical literature relevant to two claims about delusions and meaning: (1) delusions are meaningful, despite being described as irrational and implausible beliefs; (2) some delusions can also enhance the sense that one's life is meaningful, supporting agency and creativity in some circumstances. Delusions are not incomprehensible representations of reality. Rather, they can help make sense of one's unusual experiences and in some circumstances even support one's endeavours, albeit temporarily and imperfectly. Acknowledging that delusions have meaning and can also give meaning to people's lives has implications for our understanding of psychotic symptoms and for addressing the stigma associated with psychiatric conditions.
妄想常常被描绘成不可理解和无意义的典型例子。在此,我们从哲学角度研究妄想与意义之间的关系,整合认知心理学和现象学精神病理学的论据与证据。我们回顾了一些与关于妄想和意义的两种主张相关的实证和哲学文献:(1)妄想是有意义的,尽管被描述为非理性和不可信的信念;(2)一些妄想还能增强一个人生活有意义的感觉,在某些情况下支持能动性和创造力。妄想并非对现实不可理解的表征。相反,它们有助于理解一个人的异常经历,并且在某些情况下甚至能支持一个人的努力,尽管只是暂时且不完美地。承认妄想有意义且能赋予人们的生活意义,对我们理解精神症状以及消除与精神疾病相关的污名化具有启示意义。