Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Salzburg, Hellbrunnerstraße 34, 5020 Salzburg, Austria; Department of Psychology, University of Salzburg, Hellbrunnerstraße 34, 5020 Salzburg, Austria.
Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Salzburg, Hellbrunnerstraße 34, 5020 Salzburg, Austria; Department of Psychology, University of Salzburg, Hellbrunnerstraße 34, 5020 Salzburg, Austria.
Cognition. 2023 Jan;230:105255. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105255. Epub 2022 Sep 8.
The standard view on explicit theory of mind development holds that children around the age of 4 years start to ascribe beliefs to themselves and others, typically tested with false belief (FB) tasks. The present study (N = 95, 53 female, 41 male, Austrian, 41 to 80 months) systematically investigated the puzzling phenomenon that FB achievers (FB+) fail knowledge (often subsumed under "true belief") tasks: Despite the story protagonist witnessing the displacement of an object these children predict that the protagonist will look for it in its original location. We replicate this result in Experiment 1. Interestingly, some of our children indicated uncertainty about the protagonist's awareness of the relevant event. Thus, in Experiment 2 a new active watching condition was designed to help children understand that the protagonist attended to the critical event. This practically eradicated the knowledge error. Experiment 3 successfully replicated these results. Implications for existing explanations, perceptual access reasoning (PAR, Fabricius, Boyer, Weimer, & Carroll, 2010) and pragmatic difficulties (Oktay-Gür & Rakoczy, 2017) are discussed.
标准的内隐心理理论发展观点认为，儿童在 4 岁左右开始将信念归因于自己和他人，通常通过错误信念（FB）任务进行测试。本研究（N=95，53 名女性，41 名男性，奥地利人，41 至 80 个月）系统地研究了一个令人困惑的现象，即 FB 成功者（FB+）在知识（通常归入“真信念”任务）任务中失败：尽管故事主角目睹了一个物体的位移，但这些孩子预测主角会在其原始位置寻找它。我们在实验 1 中复制了这一结果。有趣的是，我们的一些孩子对主角对相关事件的意识表示不确定。因此，在实验 2 中设计了一种新的主动观察条件，以帮助孩子理解主角关注了关键事件。这实际上消除了知识错误。实验 3 成功地复制了这些结果。讨论了对现有解释、感知访问推理（PAR，Fabricius、Boyer、Weimer 和 Carroll，2010）和语用困难（Oktay-Gür 和 Rakoczy，2017）的影响。
