指责游戏：新冠疫情危机与财务表现。

The blame game: COVID-19 crisis and financial performance.

作者信息

Brahmana Rayenda Khresna, Setiawan Doddy, Kontesa Maria

机构信息

College of Business Administration, University of Bahrain, Sakhir, Kingdom of Bahrain.

Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Sebelas Maret, Surakarta, 57126 Central Java Indonesia.

出版信息

SN Bus Econ. 2022;2(11):173. doi: 10.1007/s43546-022-00352-w. Epub 2022 Oct 15.

DOI:10.1007/s43546-022-00352-w

PMID:36268518

原文链接:https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9569173/

Abstract

UNLABELLED

This research investigates the manager's impression management during the COVID-19 pandemic by gauging the agency theory framework. We examine how managers blame COVID-19 when the firms experience declining performance to retain their reputation. Overall, our results indicate that those firms with declining performance will blame COVID-19 compared to those with expected performance. It also indicates that the odds of COVID-19 appearing in the financial report will be higher in the declining performance firms. Our analysis confirms the impression management theory and agency theory by suggesting that, under declining performance, managers blame COVID-19 as the justifications to alter the attention from their incapability to the black swan event.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s43546-022-00352-w.

摘要

未标注

本研究通过衡量代理理论框架，调查了新冠疫情期间管理者的印象管理。我们研究了公司业绩下滑时管理者如何归咎于新冠疫情以维护自身声誉。总体而言，我们的结果表明，与业绩符合预期的公司相比，业绩下滑的公司会将责任归咎于新冠疫情。这也表明，在业绩下滑的公司中，新冠疫情出现在财务报告中的几率会更高。我们的分析证实了印象管理理论和代理理论，即业绩下滑时，管理者将新冠疫情作为借口，将注意力从自身能力不足转移到这一黑天鹅事件上。