School of Humanities, Arts, and Cultural Studies, Arizona State University, Phoenix, Arizona, USA.
Camb Q Healthc Ethics. 2023 Jul;32(3):357-367. doi: 10.1017/S0963180122000809. Epub 2023 Jan 17.
In this paper, I will examine the Supreme Court of the United States' (SCOTUS) arguments in the majority decision in and I will show how some of those arguments are flawed. Primarily, I will show that the right to bodily autonomy is a well-established right, both in the courts and in societal practices, and that the right to an abortion should be understood as an example of the right to bodily autonomy or bodily integrity. Second, I will examine the justices' arguments that viability is not a reasonable place to restrict abortion access, in contrast to both and , and will offer arguments that defend viability as a valid point to limit abortion access. Third, I will highlight some politicians' goals to enact a federal ban on abortion, and show how the attempt to pass Personhood Amendments is a pathway for doing so. The upshot of this essay to is show how the SCOTUS decision is flawed, and how granting personhood to "potential life" has consequences that extend beyond abortion access.
在本文中，我将审查美国最高法院（SCOTUS）在多数裁决中的论点，我将展示其中一些论点是有缺陷的。主要，我将表明，身体自主权是一项既定的权利，无论是在法庭上还是在社会实践中，而且堕胎权应该被理解为身体自主权或身体完整性权利的一个例子。其次，我将审查大法官们的论点，即生存能力不是限制堕胎机会的合理地点，与 和 相反，并将提出支持生存能力作为限制堕胎机会的有效论点。第三，我将强调一些政治家颁布联邦堕胎禁令的目标，并展示试图通过人格修正案是实现这一目标的途径。本文的结论是，展示了 SCOTUS 的裁决是有缺陷的，以及将“潜在生命”人格化对堕胎机会的影响超出了堕胎机会的范围。
