VOICES Health Policy Research Center, Department of Orthopaedic Surgery, Stanford University, Redwood City, CA, USA.
Department of Orthopaedic Surgery, University of California at San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, USA.
Clin Orthop Relat Res. 2023 Jun 1;481(6):1061-1068. doi: 10.1097/CORR.0000000000002489. Epub 2022 Dec 13.
Price variations in healthcare can be caused by quality or factors other than quality such as market share, negotiating power with insurers, or hospital ownership model. Efforts to improve care value (defined as the ratio between health outcomes and price) by making healthcare prices readily accessible to patients are driven by the assumption this can help patients more easily identify high-quality, low-price clinicians and health systems, thus reducing price variations. However, if price variations are driven by factors other than quality, then strategies that involve payments for higher-quality care are unlikely to reduce price variation and improve value. It is unknown whether prices for total joint arthroplasty (TJA) are correlated with the quality of care or whether factors other than quality are responsible for price variation.
QUESTIONS/PURPOSES: (1) How do prices insurers negotiate for TJA paid to a single, large health system vary across payer types? (2) Are the mean prices insurers negotiate for TJA associated with hospital quality?
We analyzed publicly available data from 22 hospitals in a single, large regional health system, four of which were excluded owing to incomplete quality information. We chose to use data from this single health system to minimize the confounding effects of between-hospital reputation or branding and geographic differences in the cost of providing care. This health system consists of large and small hospitals serving urban and rural populations, providing care for more than 3 million individuals. For each hospital, negotiated prices for TJA were classified into five payer types: commercial in-network, commercial out-of-network, Medicare Advantage (plans to which private insurers contract to provide Medicare benefits), Medicaid, and discounted cash pay. Traditional Medicare plans were not included because the prices are set statutorily, not negotiated. We obtained hospital quality measures from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services quality measures included TJA-specific complication and readmission rates in addition to hospital-wide patient survey star rating (measure of patient care experience) and total performance scores (aggregate measure of clinical outcomes, safety, patient experience, process of care, and efficiency). We evaluated the association between the mean negotiated hospital prices and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services quality measures using Pearson correlation coefficients and Spearman rho across all payer types. Statistical significance was defined as p < 0.0025.
The mean ± SD overall negotiated price for TJA was USD 54,500 ± 23,200. In the descriptive analysis, the lowest negotiated prices were associated with Medicare Advantage (USD 20,400 ± 1800) and Medicaid (USD 20,300 ± 8600) insurance plans, and the highest prices were associated with out-of-network care covered by commercial insurance plans (USD 78,800 ± 9200). There was no correlation between the mean negotiated price and TJA complication rate (discounted cash price: r = 0.27, p = 0.29; commercial out-of-network: r = 0.28, p = 0.26; commercial in-network: r = -0.07, p = 0.79; Medicare Advantage: r = 0.11, p = 0.65; Medicaid: r = 0.03, p = 0.92), readmission rate (discounted cash price: r = 0.19, p = 0.46; commercial out-of-network: r = 0.24, p = 0.33; commercial in-network: r = -0.13, p = 0.61; Medicare Advantage: r = -0.06, p = 0.81; Medicaid: r = 0.09, p = 0.74), patient survey star rating (discounted cash price: r = -0.55, p = 0.02; commercial out-of-network: r = -0.53, p = 0.02; commercial in-network: r = -0.37, p = 0.13; Medicare Advantage: r = -0.08, p = 0.75; Medicaid: r = -0.02, p = 0.95), or total hospital performance score (discounted cash price: r = -0.35, p = 0.15; commercial out-of-network: r = -0.55, p = 0.02; commercial in-network: r = -0.53, p = 0.02; Medicare Advantage: r = -0.28, p = 0.25; Medicaid: r = 0.11, p = 0.69) for any of the payer types evaluated.
There is substantial price variation for TJA that is not accounted for by the quality of care, suggesting that a mismatch between price and quality exists. Efforts to improve care value in TJA are needed to directly link prices with the quality of care delivered, such as through matched quality and price reporting mechanisms. Future studies might investigate whether making price and quality data accessible to patients, such as through value dashboards that report easy-to-interpret quality data alongside price information, moves patients toward higher-value care decisions.
Efforts to better match the quality of care with negotiated prices such as matched quality and price reporting mechanisms, which have been shown to increase the likelihood of choosing higher-value care in TJA, could improve the value of care.
医疗保健中的价格差异可能是由质量或质量以外的因素引起的,例如市场份额、与保险公司的谈判能力或医院所有权模式。通过使患者更容易获得医疗保健价格,努力提高护理价值(定义为健康结果与价格之间的比率),这是基于这样一种假设,即这可以帮助患者更容易识别高质量、低价格的临床医生和医疗系统,从而降低价格差异。然而,如果价格差异是由质量以外的因素引起的,那么涉及更高质量护理的支付策略不太可能降低价格差异并提高价值。目前尚不清楚全膝关节置换术(TJA)的价格是否与护理质量相关,或者是否有质量以外的因素导致价格变化。
问题/目的:(1)单一大型区域卫生系统中保险公司协商支付给单一大型卫生系统的 TJA 价格会因支付类型而异吗?(2)医院质量与保险公司协商的 TJA 价格是否相关?
我们分析了单个大型区域卫生系统内 22 家医院的公开可用数据,其中有 4 家由于质量信息不完整而被排除在外。我们选择使用来自单个卫生系统的数据来尽量减少医院声誉或品牌以及提供护理成本的地理差异之间的混杂效应。该卫生系统由服务于城市和农村人口的大型和小型医院组成,为超过 300 万人提供护理。对于每家医院,TJA 的协商价格分为五类支付者类型:商业网络内、商业网络外、医疗保险优势(计划与私人保险公司签订合同以提供医疗保险福利)、医疗补助和现金折扣。不包括传统的医疗保险计划,因为这些价格是法定的,不是协商的。我们从医疗保险和医疗补助服务中心获得医院质量指标。医疗保险和医疗补助服务中心的质量指标包括 TJA 特定的并发症和再入院率,以及医院范围的患者调查星级评分(患者护理体验的衡量标准)和总绩效评分(临床结果、安全性、患者体验、护理过程和效率的综合衡量标准)。我们使用 Pearson 相关系数和 Spearman rho 评估了所有支付类型的中心医疗保险和医疗补助服务中心质量指标与中心医疗保险和医疗补助服务中心质量指标之间的关联。统计显著性定义为 p < 0.0025。
TJA 的总体协商平均价格为 54500 美元±23200 美元。在描述性分析中,医疗保险优势(20400 美元±1800 美元)和医疗补助(20300 美元±8600 美元)保险计划的协商价格最低,而商业保险计划涵盖的网络外护理的协商价格最高(78800 美元±9200 美元)。平均协商价格与 TJA 并发症率之间没有相关性(现金折扣价:r = 0.27,p = 0.29;商业网络外:r = 0.28,p = 0.26;商业网络内:r = -0.07,p = 0.79;医疗保险优势:r = 0.11,p = 0.65;医疗补助:r = 0.03,p = 0.92),再入院率(现金折扣价:r = 0.19,p = 0.46;商业网络外:r = 0.24,p = 0.33;商业网络内:r = -0.13,p = 0.61;医疗保险优势:r = -0.06,p = 0.81;医疗补助:r = 0.09,p = 0.74),患者调查星级评分(现金折扣价:r = -0.55,p = 0.02;商业网络外:r = -0.53,p = 0.02;商业网络内:r = -0.37,p = 0.13;医疗保险优势:r = -0.08,p = 0.75;医疗补助:r = -0.02,p = 0.95)或医院整体绩效评分(现金折扣价:r = -0.35,p = 0.15;商业网络外:r = -0.55,p = 0.02;商业网络内:r = -0.53,p = 0.02;医疗保险优势:r = -0.28,p = 0.25;医疗补助:r = 0.11,p = 0.69)。
TJA 的价格差异很大,无法用护理质量来解释,这表明价格与质量之间存在不匹配。需要努力提高 TJA 的护理价值,以直接将价格与提供的护理质量联系起来,例如通过匹配质量和价格报告机制。未来的研究可能会调查是否通过价值仪表板向患者提供价格和质量数据,例如通过报告易于理解的质量数据以及价格信息,使患者更倾向于做出更高价值的护理决策。
通过匹配质量和价格报告机制等努力更好地将护理质量与协商价格相匹配,这已被证明可以增加在 TJA 中选择更高价值护理的可能性,从而提高护理的价值。