Department of Philosophy and Neuroscience Institute, Georgia State University.
Department of Psychology, Princeton University.
Cogn Sci. 2023 Feb;47(2):e13245. doi: 10.1111/cogs.13245.
The notion of belief appears frequently in cognitive science. Yet it has resisted definition of the sort that could clarify inquiry. How then might a cognitive science of belief proceed? Here we propose a form of pluralism about believing. According to this view, there are importantly different ways to "believe" an idea. These distinct psychological kinds occur within a multi-dimensional property space, with different property clusters within that space constituting distinct varieties of believing. We propose that discovering such property clusters is empirically tractable, and that this approach can help sidestep merely verbal disputes about what constitutes "belief."
信念这一概念在认知科学中频繁出现。然而，它一直难以被定义，这使得相关研究难以明晰。那么，信仰的认知科学应该如何开展呢？在这里，我们提出一种关于信念的多元主义观点。根据这种观点，“相信”一个观点有非常不同的方式。这些不同的心理类型存在于多维属性空间中，该空间中的不同属性簇构成了不同种类的信念。我们提出，发现这种属性簇在经验上是可行的，并且这种方法可以帮助避免关于“信念”构成的仅仅是口头的争论。
