School of Management, Yale University, United States of America.
Department of Psychology, Princeton University, United States of America.
Cognition. 2023 May;234:105379. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105379. Epub 2023 Feb 13.
People often engage in biased reasoning, favoring some beliefs over others even when the result is a departure from impartial or evidence-based reasoning. Psychologists have long assumed that people are unaware of these biases and operate under an "illusion of objectivity." We identify an important domain of life in which people harbor little illusion about their biases - when they are biased for moral reasons. For instance, people endorse and feel justified believing morally desirable propositions even when they think they lack evidence for them (Study 1a/1b). Moreover, when people engage in morally desirable motivated reasoning, they recognize the influence of moral biases on their judgment, but nevertheless evaluate their reasoning as ideal (Studies 2-4). These findings overturn longstanding assumptions about motivated reasoning and identify a boundary condition on Naïve Realism and the Bias Blind Spot. People's tendency to be aware and proud of their biases provides both new opportunities, and new challenges, for resolving ideological conflict and improving reasoning.
人们常常进行有偏差的推理,即使结果偏离公正或基于证据的推理,也会偏爱某些信念而不是其他信念。长期以来,心理学家一直认为,人们没有意识到这些偏见,而是在“客观错觉”下运作。我们发现了一个重要的生活领域,在这个领域中,人们对自己的偏见几乎没有错觉——当他们出于道德原因而产生偏见时。例如,人们支持并认为有理由相信道德上可取的命题,即使他们认为自己缺乏证据支持这些命题(研究 1a/1b)。此外,当人们进行道德上可取的动机推理时,他们认识到道德偏见对他们判断的影响,但仍然将他们的推理评价为理想的(研究 2-4)。这些发现推翻了关于动机推理的长期假设,并确定了朴素现实主义和偏见盲点的一个边界条件。人们对自己偏见的认识和自豪的倾向为解决意识形态冲突和提高推理能力提供了新的机会和新的挑战。