Ghafoor Sadeen, Zulfiqar Muhammad, Wang Man, Wang Chunlin, Islam Md Rashidul
School of Accounting, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, China and China Internal Control Research Center, Dalian, Liaoning, People's Republic of China.
Department of Management Sciences, Khwaja Fareed University of Engineering and Information Technology, Rahim Yar Khan, Pakistan.
Psychol Res Behav Manag. 2023 Feb 13;16:397-417. doi: 10.2147/PRBM.S383279. eCollection 2023.
The novel study describes the behXavioural phenomena of family firm types and explores the relationship between the family firm types of control diversity and Research and Development (R&D) investments. Acquiring controlling rights is a psychological phenomenon for family firm owners. The moderating effect of CEO compensations on R&D investments is investigated.
We collected data of listed A-share family firms in China from 2011 to 2020 in the China Stock Market and Accounting Research database. We used Tobit regression for data analysis.
RESULTS/FINDING: The study concludes that lone-controller family firms (LCFFs) are less willing to invest in R&D and multi-controller family firms (MCFFs) have positive behaviour towards R&D. The moderating role of CEO compensation deviates the willingness and behaviour to invest in R&D.
CONCLUSION/ORIGINALITY: To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to outline the paradoxical empirical evidence on family firms and R&D investments by analysing control diversity and how the moderating role of CEO compensation nexus can alter willingness towards R&D. The study is a novel attempt following De Massis et al's framework to test the willingness and ability of LCFFs and MCFFs. Previous studies based on agency theory have tacitly assumed that ability and willingness exist in family-controlled firms. However, this study challenges this implicit assumption.
这项新研究描述了家族企业类型的行为现象，并探讨了控制权多样性的家族企业类型与研发（R&D）投资之间的关系。获取控制权对家族企业所有者来说是一种心理现象。研究了首席执行官薪酬对研发投资的调节作用。
我们从中国股票市场与会计研究数据库中收集了2011年至2020年中国A股上市家族企业的数据。我们使用Tobit回归进行数据分析。
结果/发现：研究得出结论，单一控制者家族企业（LCFFs）不太愿意投资于研发，而多个控制者家族企业（MCFFs）对研发有积极行为。首席执行官薪酬的调节作用偏离了研发投资的意愿和行为。
结论/原创性：据我们所知，本研究首次通过分析控制权多样性以及首席执行官薪酬关系的调节作用如何改变对研发的意愿，概述了关于家族企业与研发投资的矛盾实证证据。该研究是继德马西斯等人的框架之后，对单一控制者家族企业和多个控制者家族企业的意愿和能力进行测试的一次新尝试。以往基于代理理论的研究默认家族控制企业存在能力和意愿。然而，本研究对这一隐含假设提出了挑战。
