Sombie Ardjouma
Department of Economy, University of Norbert Zongo, Koudougou, Burkina Faso.
Center for Research on Regional Economic Integration (CRREI), Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.
SN Bus Econ. 2023;3(3):80. doi: 10.1007/s43546-023-00452-1. Epub 2023 Feb 25.
This study analyses the distributional effects of corruption on public spending in developing countries. It hypothesized that public expenditures with long and complex budgetary procedures are more prone to corruption. However, the new instrumental variables method proposed by Norkute et al. (J Economet 10.1016/j.jeconom.2020.04.008, 2021), was used to correct for the endogenous nature of corruption and the cross-sectional dependence bias of the panel units. The empirical analysis involved data from a sample of 40 countries, observed over the period 2005-2018. The main results show that the bias induced by corruption on the allocation of public expenditure depends as much on the opportunity offered by the expenditure in terms of payment of bribes as on the recipient of this expenditure. Investment spending with complex procedures is favored by corrupt bureaucrats over current spending. Wages and salaries are favored by corruption because they increase the financial benefits of bureaucrats. National and international anti-corruption institutions need to pay particular attention to the channels through which these public expenditure components are processed to establish greater transparency.
The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s43546-023-00452-1.
本研究分析了腐败对发展中国家公共支出的分配效应。研究假设，预算程序冗长复杂的公共支出更容易发生腐败。然而，本研究采用了诺尔库特等人（《计量经济学杂志》，10.1016/j.jeconom.2020.04.008，2021年）提出的新工具变量法，以纠正腐败的内生性和面板单位的横截面依赖偏差。实证分析涉及40个国家在2005 - 2018年期间的样本数据。主要结果表明，腐败对公共支出分配造成的偏差，既取决于支出在行贿方面提供的机会，也取决于该支出的接受者。与经常性支出相比，程序复杂的投资支出更受腐败官僚的青睐。工资和薪金受到腐败的青睐，因为它们增加了官僚的经济利益。国家和国际反腐败机构需要特别关注这些公共支出组成部分的处理渠道，以建立更高的透明度。
在线版本包含可在10.1007/s43546-023-00452-1获取的补充材料。
