Department of Law, University of Bergamo, Bergamo, Italy.
IRCCS Ospedale San Raffaele Scientific Institute, Milan, Italy.
Bioethics. 2023 Jun;37(5):449-461. doi: 10.1111/bioe.13150. Epub 2023 Mar 14.
Procreative obligations are often discussed by evaluating only the consequences of reproductive actions or omissions; less attention is paid to the moral role of intentions and attitudes. In this paper, I assess whether intentions and attitudes can contribute to defining our moral obligations with regard to assisted reproductive technologies already available, such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), and those that may be available in future, such as reproductive genome editing and ectogenesis, in a way compatible with person-affecting constraints. I propose the parent-child relationship argument, which is based on the moral distinction between creating and parenting a child. Hence, I first argue that intentions and attitudes can play a role in defining our moral obligations in reproductive decisions involving PGD. Second, I maintain that if we accept this and recognize reproductive genome editing and ectogenesis as person-affecting procedures, we should be committed to arguing that prospective parents may have moral reasons to prefer reproduction via such techniques than via sexual intercourse. In both cases, I observe an extension of our procreative responsibility beyond what is proposed by the consequentialist person-affecting morality.
生殖义务通常仅通过评估生殖行为或不作为的后果来讨论；对意图和态度的道德作用关注较少。在本文中，我评估了意图和态度是否可以有助于根据已经存在的辅助生殖技术（如胚胎植入前遗传学诊断（PGD））和未来可能存在的技术（如生殖基因组编辑和外生性）来定义我们的道德义务，这些技术符合影响人的限制。我提出了亲子关系论点，该论点基于创造和养育孩子之间的道德区别。因此，我首先论证意图和态度在涉及 PGD 的生殖决策中可以在定义我们的道德义务方面发挥作用。其次，我认为，如果我们接受这一点，并认识到生殖基因组编辑和外生性是影响人的程序，我们应该致力于论证，预期父母可能有道德理由通过这些技术而不是通过性交来进行繁殖。在这两种情况下，我观察到我们的生殖责任超出了后果主义影响人的道德所提出的范围。
