Bau Natalie
University of California, Los Angeles, National Bureau of Economic Research, Centre for Economic Policy Research, and Center for Effective Global Action.
J Polit Econ. 2022 Jul;130(7):1717-1764. doi: 10.1086/719760. Epub 2022 May 4.
The quality of the match between students and schools affects learning, but little is known about the magnitude of these effects or how they respond to changes in market structure. I develop a quantitative equilibrium model of school competition with horizontal competition in match quality. I estimate the model using data from Pakistan, a country with high private enrollment, and (1) quantify the importance of good matches, (2) show that profit-maximizing private schools' choices of quality advantage wealthier students, increasing inequality and reducing welfare and learning, and (3) provide intuition for when interventions in the market are valuable.
学生与学校之间匹配的质量会影响学习，但对于这些影响的程度以及它们如何对市场结构变化做出反应，我们知之甚少。我构建了一个在匹配质量方面存在横向竞争的学校竞争定量均衡模型。我使用来自巴基斯坦的数据对该模型进行估计，巴基斯坦是一个私立入学率很高的国家，并且（1）量化了良好匹配的重要性，（2）表明追求利润最大化的私立学校对质量的选择有利于更富有的学生，加剧了不平等并降低了福利和学习效果，以及（3）为市场干预何时有价值提供了直观解释。
