Department of Geography and Resource Management, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, New Territories, Hong Kong.
Department of Geography and Resource Management, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, New Territories, Hong Kong.
J Environ Manage. 2023 Jul 1;337:117725. doi: 10.1016/j.jenvman.2023.117725. Epub 2023 Mar 16.
To reduce carbon emissions and pursue sustainable economic development, China's central government formulated the low-carbon city pilot (LCCP) policy. Current studies focus primarily on the impact of the policy at the macro level (provinces and cities). So far, no study has looked at the impact of the LCCP policy on companies' environmental expenditures. Besides, as the LCCP policy is a weak-constraining central policy, it is interesting to see how it works at the company level. We employ company-level empirical data and the Propensity Score Matching - Difference in Differences (PSM-DID) method, which outperforms the traditional DID model in avoiding sample selection bias, to address the above issues. We concentrate on the second phase of the LCCP policy from 2010 to 2016, encompassing 197 listed companies in China's secondary and transportation industries. Our statistical results show that if the listed company's host city has piloted the LCCP policy, the company's environmental expenditures are reduced by 0.91 points at the 1% significance level. The above finding calls attention to the policy-implementation gap between the central and the local governments in China, which may make those weak-constraining central policies like the LCCP policy have purpose-defeating outcomes at the company level.
为了减少碳排放,追求可持续的经济发展,中国中央政府制定了低碳城市试点(LCCP)政策。目前的研究主要集中在政策对宏观层面(省和市)的影响上。到目前为止,还没有研究关注 LCCP 政策对公司环境支出的影响。此外,由于 LCCP 政策是一项弱约束的中央政策,因此了解它在公司层面的运作方式很有趣。我们利用公司层面的经验数据和倾向得分匹配-双重差分法(PSM-DID),该方法在避免样本选择偏差方面优于传统的 DID 模型,解决了上述问题。我们专注于 LCCP 政策的第二阶段,即 2010 年至 2016 年,涵盖了中国第二产业和交通行业的 197 家上市公司。我们的统计结果表明,如果上市公司的所在地城市试点了 LCCP 政策,那么该公司的环境支出在 1%的显著水平上减少了 0.91 分。上述发现引起了人们对中国中央政府和地方政府之间政策执行差距的关注,这可能使 LCCP 等弱约束的中央政策在公司层面产生适得其反的结果。