Dawson K
Monash University, Australia.
J Med Ethics. 1987 Dec;13(4):173-8. doi: 10.1136/jme.13.4.173.
The debate about the moral status of the embryo has gained new impetus because of the advances in reproductive technology that have made early human embryo experimentation a possibility, and because of the public concern that this arouses. Several philosophical arguments claiming that fertilisation is the event that accords moral status to the embryo were initially formulated in the context of the abortion debate. Were they formulated with sufficient precision to account for the scientific facts as we now understand them? Or do these arguments need modification? Aspects of three arguments for moral status being acquired at fertilisation are examined in relation to current scientific knowledge, highlighting the reasons why such arguments, at present, seem to provide an inadequate basis for the determination of moral status.
由于生殖技术的进步使早期人类胚胎实验成为可能，以及由此引发的公众关注，关于胚胎道德地位的争论有了新的推动力。一些认为受精赋予胚胎道德地位的哲学观点最初是在堕胎辩论的背景下提出的。这些观点的阐述是否足够精确，能够涵盖我们现在所理解的科学事实？还是这些观点需要修正？本文结合当前科学知识审视了支持受精时获得道德地位的三种观点，强调了为何目前这些观点似乎无法为确定道德地位提供充分依据。
