Margoni Francesco, Brown Teneille R
Department of Psychology, University of Oslo, Norway; Department of Social Studies, University of Stavanger, Norway.
SJ Quinney College of Law, Center for Law and Biomedical Sciences, University Of Utah, United States of America.
Cognition. 2023 Jul;236:105442. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105442. Epub 2023 Mar 28.
To prove guilt, jurors in many countries must find that the criminal defendant acted with a particular mental state. However, this amateur form of mindreading is not supposed to occur in civil negligence trials. Instead, jurors should decide whether the defendant was negligent by looking only at his actions, and whether they were objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Even so, across four pre-registered studies (N = 782), we showed that mock jurors do not focus on actions alone. US mock jurors spontaneously rely on mental state information when evaluating negligence cases. In Study 1, jurors were given three negligence cases to judge, and were asked to evaluate whether a reasonably careful person would have foreseen the risk (foreseeability) and whether the defendant acted unreasonably (negligence). Across conditions, we also varied the extent and content of additional information about defendant's subjective mental state: jurors were provided with evidence that the defendant either thought the risk of a harm was high or was low, or were not provided with such information. Foreseeability and negligence scores increased when mock jurors were told the defendant thought there was a high risk, and negligence scores decreased when the defendant thought there was a low risk, compared to when no background mental state information was provided. In Study 2, we replicated these findings by using mild (as opposed to severe) harm cases. In Study 3, we tested an intervention aimed at reducing jurors' reliance on mental states, which consisted in raising jurors' awareness of potential hindsight bias in their evaluations. The intervention reduced mock juror reliance on mental states when assessing foreseeability when the defendant was described as knowing of a high risk, an effect replicated in Study 4. This research demonstrates that jurors rely on mental states to assess breach, regardless of what the legal doctrine says.
为了证明有罪,许多国家的陪审员必须认定刑事被告的行为具有特定的心理状态。然而,这种业余的读心术形式不应该出现在民事过失审判中。相反,陪审员应该仅通过观察被告的行为来判定被告是否存在过失,以及在当时的情况下这些行为是否客观合理。即便如此,通过四项预先注册的研究(N = 782),我们发现模拟陪审员并非仅关注行为本身。美国的模拟陪审员在评估过失案件时会自发地依赖心理状态信息。在研究1中,陪审员被给予三个过失案件进行评判,并被要求评估一个合理谨慎的人是否能够预见风险(可预见性)以及被告的行为是否不合理(过失)。在不同条件下,我们还改变了关于被告主观心理状态的额外信息的程度和内容:向陪审员提供证据表明被告要么认为伤害风险高,要么认为风险低,要么不提供此类信息。与未提供背景心理状态信息时相比,当模拟陪审员被告知被告认为风险高时,可预见性和过失得分增加;当被告认为风险低时,过失得分降低。在研究2中,我们通过使用轻微(而非严重)伤害案件重复了这些发现。在研究3中,我们测试了一种旨在减少陪审员对心理状态依赖的干预措施,该措施包括提高陪审员对其评估中潜在后见之明偏差的认识。当被告被描述为知晓高风险时,该干预措施在评估可预见性时减少了模拟陪审员对心理状态的依赖,这一效果在研究4中得到了重复。这项研究表明,无论法律原则如何规定,陪审员都会依赖心理状态来评估违约行为。