Business School, Chengdu University of Technology, Chengdu, China.
College of Economics and Management, Nanjing Forestry University, Nanjing, China.
PLoS One. 2023 Jun 23;18(6):e0287615. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0287615. eCollection 2023.
In modern enterprises with a separation of powers, the ultimate controller can effectively influence the implementation of corporate strategy and operational management efficiency, as well as improve corporate governance by monitoring and limiting the management entrenchment effect within enterprises. Based on the information pertaining to ultimate controllers disclosed by enterprises in their annual reports, this study empirically tested whether the absence of the ultimate controller impacts investment efficiency using the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2020. It was found that the investment efficiency of enterprises without ultimate controllers is relatively lower than those with ultimate controllers. This is reflected in the insufficient investment of enterprises without an ultimate controller. Moreover, the effect is more significant when the financial environment, internal governance environment, and external governance environment of firms are worse. The mechanism analysis demonstrated that the absence of an ultimate controller causes a more severe insider agency problem and a significantly higher degree of financing constraints, which leads to underinvestment and reduces investment efficiency of firms. The economic consequence test also found that the inefficient investment caused by the absence of ultimate controllers would damage the future value of enterprises, but would increase managers' compensation. Overall, this study suggests that ultimate controllers are an important part of a firm's internal governance, especially for monitoring management behavior and resolving agency conflicts.
在权力分离的现代企业中，终极控制人可以通过监督和限制企业内部的管理层自利行为，有效影响公司战略的实施和经营管理效率，改善公司治理。本文基于企业年报中披露的终极控制人信息，以 2007-2020 年中国 A 股上市公司为样本，实证检验了终极控制人缺失对企业投资效率的影响。研究发现，终极控制人缺失的企业投资效率相对较低，表现为投资不足，且该结论在考虑企业财务环境、内部治理环境和外部治理环境等因素后依然成立。机制检验表明，终极控制人缺失导致更为严重的内部人代理问题和更高程度的融资约束，进而引发企业投资不足，降低企业投资效率。经济后果检验发现，终极控制人缺失导致的非效率投资会损害企业未来价值，但会增加管理层薪酬。总体而言，本文研究表明终极控制人是公司内部治理的重要组成部分，对监督管理层行为和解决代理冲突具有重要作用。
