Fang Xing, Zhang Hongxin, Cui Xiaotong, Wang Yuanzhen, Ding Linxi
School of Electronic Engineering, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, China.
Beijing Key Laboratory of Work Safety Intelligent Monitoring, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, China.
Entropy (Basel). 2023 Jun 7;25(6):908. doi: 10.3390/e25060908.
Lightweight block ciphers are normally used in low-power resource-constrained environments, while providing reliable and sufficient security. Therefore, it is important to study the security and reliability of lightweight block ciphers. SKINNY is a new lightweight tweakable block cipher. In this paper, we present an efficient attack scheme for SKINNY-64 based on algebraic fault analysis. The optimal fault injection location is given by analyzing the diffusion of a single-bit fault at different locations during the encryption process. At the same time, by combining the algebraic fault analysis method based on S-box decomposition, the master key can be recovered in an average time of 9 s using one fault. To the best of our knowledge, our proposed attack scheme requires fewer faults, is faster to solve, and has a higher success rate than other existing attack methods.
轻量级分组密码通常用于低功耗资源受限环境,同时提供可靠且足够的安全性。因此,研究轻量级分组密码的安全性和可靠性很重要。SKINNY是一种新型的可调整轻量级分组密码。在本文中,我们提出了一种基于代数故障分析的针对SKINNY-64的高效攻击方案。通过分析加密过程中不同位置的单比特故障扩散情况,给出了最优故障注入位置。同时,结合基于S盒分解的代数故障分析方法,利用一个故障平均9秒就能恢复主密钥。据我们所知,我们提出的攻击方案所需故障更少、求解速度更快且成功率比其他现有攻击方法更高。