Dept. of Philosophy, 1866 Main Mall, E370, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z1, Canada.
Department of Philosophy and Hang Seng Centre for Cognitive Studies, University of Sheffield, 45 Victoria Street, Sheffield S3 7QB, United Kingdom.
Cognition. 2023 Nov;240:105583. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105583. Epub 2023 Aug 30.
The notion of domain specificity plays a central role in some of the most important debates in cognitive science. Yet, despite the widespread reliance on domain specificity in recent theorizing in cognitive science, this notion remains elusive. Critics have claimed that the notion of domain specificity can't bear the theoretical weight that has been put on it and that it should be abandoned. Even its most steadfast proponents have highlighted puzzles and tensions that arise once one tries to go beyond an initial intuitive sketch of what domain specificity involves. In this paper, we address these concerns head on by developing an account of what it means for a cognitive mechanism to be domain specific that overcomes the obstacles that have made domain specificity seem so problematic. We then apply this understanding of domain specificity to one of the key debates that it has figured prominently in-the rationalism-empiricism debate concerning the origins of cognitive traits-and introduce several related theoretical notions that work alongside domain specificity in helping to clarify what makes a view more (or less) rationalist. This example illustrates how the notion of domain specificity can, and should, continue to play a central role in ongoing debates in cognitive science.
领域特殊性的概念在认知科学中一些最重要的争论中起着核心作用。然而，尽管在认知科学的最近理论中广泛依赖领域特殊性，但这个概念仍然难以捉摸。批评者声称，领域特殊性的概念无法承受已经施加在它身上的理论重量，应该被抛弃。即使是它最坚定的支持者也强调了一旦试图超越对领域特殊性所涉及内容的最初直观理解，就会出现的困惑和紧张。在本文中，我们通过提出一种认知机制具有领域特殊性的含义来直面这些担忧，这种含义克服了使领域特殊性看起来如此成问题的障碍。然后，我们将这种领域特殊性的理解应用于它突出体现的一个关键争论中——关于认知特征起源的理性主义-经验主义争论——并引入了几个相关的理论概念，它们与领域特殊性一起帮助澄清是什么使一种观点更（或不那么）理性主义。这个例子说明了领域特殊性的概念如何能够并且应该继续在认知科学的持续争论中发挥核心作用。
