• 文献检索
  • 文档翻译
  • 深度研究
  • 学术资讯
  • Suppr Zotero 插件Zotero 插件
  • 邀请有礼
  • 套餐&价格
  • 历史记录
应用&插件
Suppr Zotero 插件Zotero 插件浏览器插件Mac 客户端Windows 客户端微信小程序
定价
高级版会员购买积分包购买API积分包
服务
文献检索文档翻译深度研究API 文档MCP 服务
关于我们
关于 Suppr公司介绍联系我们用户协议隐私条款
关注我们

Suppr 超能文献

核心技术专利:CN118964589B侵权必究
粤ICP备2023148730 号-1Suppr @ 2026

文献检索

告别复杂PubMed语法,用中文像聊天一样搜索,搜遍4000万医学文献。AI智能推荐,让科研检索更轻松。

立即免费搜索

文件翻译

保留排版,准确专业,支持PDF/Word/PPT等文件格式,支持 12+语言互译。

免费翻译文档

深度研究

AI帮你快速写综述,25分钟生成高质量综述,智能提取关键信息,辅助科研写作。

立即免费体验

税收门槛在空间公共物品博弈中产生多个最优合作水平。

Tax thresholds yield multiple optimal cooperation levels in the spatial public goods game.

机构信息

School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming 650221, China.

Interdisciplinary Research Institute of Data Science, Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting and Finance, Shanghai 201209, China.

出版信息

Chaos. 2023 Dec 1;33(12). doi: 10.1063/5.0180979.

DOI:10.1063/5.0180979
PMID:38085227
Abstract

Income redistribution, which involves transferring income from certain individuals to others, plays a crucial role in human societies. Previous research has indicated that tax-based redistribution can promote cooperation by enhancing incentives for cooperators. In such a tax system, all individuals, irrespective of their income levels, contribute to the tax system, and the tax revenue is subsequently redistributed to everyone. In this study, we relax this assumption by introducing a tax threshold, signifying that only individuals with incomes exceeding the threshold will be subject to taxation. In particular, we employ the spatial public goods game to investigate the influence of tax rates-the percentage of income allocated to tax-and tax thresholds, which determine the income level at which individuals become taxable, on the evolution of cooperation. Our extensive numerical simulations disclose that tax thresholds produce complex outcomes for the evolution of cooperation, depending on tax rates. Notably, at low tax rates (i.e., below 0.41), as the tax threshold increases, discontinuous phase transitions in cooperation performance suggest the presence of multiple intervals of effective tax thresholds that promote peak cooperation levels. Nevertheless, irrespective of the chosen tax rate, once the tax threshold surpasses a critical threshold, the redistribution mechanism fails, causing the collapse of cooperation. Evolutionary snapshots show that self-organized redistribution forms an intermediary layer on the peripheries of cooperative clusters, effectively shielding cooperators from potential defectors. Quantitative analyses shed light on how self-organized redistribution narrows the income gap between cooperators and defectors through precise identification of tax-exempt entities, thereby amplifying the cooperative advantage. Collectively, these findings enhance our comprehension of how income redistribution influences cooperation, highlighting the pivotal role of tax thresholds.

摘要

收入再分配,即将收入从某些个体转移给其他人,在人类社会中起着至关重要的作用。先前的研究表明,基于税收的再分配可以通过增强合作者的激励来促进合作。在这样的税收制度中,所有个体,无论其收入水平如何,都要为税收制度做出贡献,而税收收入随后会再分配给每个人。在本研究中,我们通过引入税收门槛来放松这一假设,即只有收入超过门槛的个体才需要纳税。具体来说,我们采用空间公共物品博弈来研究税率(分配给税收的收入百分比)和税收门槛(决定个体开始纳税的收入水平)对合作演化的影响。我们广泛的数值模拟揭示了税收门槛对合作演化的复杂影响,这取决于税率。值得注意的是,在低税率(即低于 0.41)下,随着税收门槛的增加,合作表现的不连续相变表明存在多个有效的税收门槛区间,这些区间可以促进合作水平达到峰值。然而,无论选择的税率如何,一旦税收门槛超过一个临界门槛,再分配机制就会失效,导致合作崩溃。演化快照表明,自组织的再分配在合作簇的外围形成了一个中间层,有效地保护了合作者免受潜在的叛徒的影响。定量分析揭示了自组织的再分配如何通过准确识别免税实体来缩小合作者和叛徒之间的收入差距,从而放大合作优势。总的来说,这些发现增强了我们对收入再分配如何影响合作的理解,强调了税收门槛的关键作用。

相似文献

1
Tax thresholds yield multiple optimal cooperation levels in the spatial public goods game.税收门槛在空间公共物品博弈中产生多个最优合作水平。
Chaos. 2023 Dec 1;33(12). doi: 10.1063/5.0180979.
2
Cooperation in public goods game does not require assortment and depends on population density.公共物品博弈中的合作并不需要分类,且取决于种群密度。
J Evol Biol. 2024 Apr 14;37(4):451-463. doi: 10.1093/jeb/voae029.
3
The public goods game with shared punishment cost in well-mixed and structured populations.混合且结构化群体中具有共同惩罚成本的公共物品博弈。
J Theor Biol. 2019 Sep 7;476:36-43. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2019.05.019. Epub 2019 May 28.
4
Can institutions foster cooperation by wealth redistribution?机构能否通过财富再分配来促进合作?
J R Soc Interface. 2024 Mar;21(212):20230698. doi: 10.1098/rsif.2023.0698. Epub 2024 Mar 13.
5
Symbiotic behaviour in the public goods game with altruistic punishment.具有利他惩罚的公共物品博弈中的共生行为。
J Theor Biol. 2021 Sep 7;524:110737. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2021.110737. Epub 2021 Apr 28.
6
Public goods games with reward in finite populations.有限群体中具有奖励的公共物品博弈。
J Math Biol. 2011 Jul;63(1):109-23. doi: 10.1007/s00285-010-0363-7. Epub 2010 Sep 24.
7
Evolution of cooperation and consistent personalities in public goods games.公共物品博弈中合作与一致人格的演化。
Sci Rep. 2021 Dec 9;11(1):23708. doi: 10.1038/s41598-021-03045-w.
8
Effect of the group size on the evolution of cooperation when an exit option is present.群体规模对存在退出选择时合作进化的影响。
J Theor Biol. 2021 Jul 21;521:110678. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2021.110678. Epub 2021 Mar 20.
9
Evolution of cooperation in an n-player game with opting out.具有退出选择的 n 人博弈中的合作演变。
Behav Processes. 2022 Nov;203:104754. doi: 10.1016/j.beproc.2022.104754. Epub 2022 Sep 28.
10
Evolution of staying together in the context of diffusible public goods.在可扩散公共物品背景下共同存在的演变。
J Theor Biol. 2014 Nov 7;360:1-12. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.06.023. Epub 2014 Jun 30.