Cultice Tyler, Clark Joseph, Yang Wu, Thapliyal Himanshu
Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996, USA.
Sensors (Basel). 2023 Dec 17;23(24):9886. doi: 10.3390/s23249886.
As the popularity of 3D printing or additive manufacturing (AM) continues to increase for use in commercial and defense supply chains, the requirement for reliable, robust protection from adversaries has become more important than ever. Three-dimensional printing security focuses on protecting both the individual Industrial Internet of Things (I-IoT) AM devices and the networks that connect hundreds of these machines together. Additionally, rapid improvements in quantum computing demonstrate a vital need for robust security in a post-quantum future for critical AM manufacturing, especially for applications in, for example, the medical and defense industries. In this paper, we discuss the attack surface of adversarial data manipulation on the physical inter-device communication bus, Controller Area Network (CAN). We propose a novel, hierarchical tree solution for a secure, post-quantum-supported security framework for CAN-based AM devices. Through using subnet hopping between isolated CAN buses, our framework maintains the ability to use legacy or third-party devices in a plug-and-play fashion while securing and minimizing the attack surface of hardware Trojans or other adversaries. The results of the physical implementation of our framework demonstrate 25% and 90% improvement in message costs for authentication compared to existing lightweight and post-quantum CAN security solutions, respectively. Additionally, we performed timing benchmarks on the normal communication (hopping) and authentication schemes of our framework.
随着3D打印或增材制造（AM）在商业和国防供应链中的应用日益普及，对来自对手的可靠、强大保护的需求比以往任何时候都更加重要。三维打印安全侧重于保护单个工业物联网（I-IoT）增材制造设备以及将数百台此类机器连接在一起的网络。此外，量子计算的迅速发展表明，在量子时代之后，关键增材制造领域，特别是在医疗和国防工业等应用中，对强大安全性有着至关重要的需求。在本文中，我们讨论了对手对物理设备间通信总线——控制器局域网（CAN）进行数据操纵的攻击面。我们为基于CAN的增材制造设备提出了一种新颖的分层树状解决方案，用于构建一个安全的、后量子支持的安全框架。通过在隔离的CAN总线之间进行子网跳跃，我们的框架能够以即插即用的方式使用传统或第三方设备，同时确保硬件木马或其他对手的攻击面得到保护并最小化。我们框架的物理实现结果表明，与现有的轻量级和后量子CAN安全解决方案相比，认证消息成本分别提高了25%和90%。此外，我们对框架的正常通信（跳跃）和认证方案进行了定时基准测试。
