Tilburg University, Department of Economics, Tilec, Netherlands; CEPR, United Kingdom.
J Health Econ. 2024 Mar;94:102868. doi: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102868. Epub 2024 Mar 5.
This paper shows that selection incentives in downstream markets distort upstream prices. It is possible for inputs to be priced above the value that the good has for final consumers. We apply this idea to pharmaceutical companies selling drugs to a health insurance market with selection problems. We specify the conditions under which drugs are sold at prices exceeding treatment value. Another feature of the model is an excessive private incentive to reduce market size, e.g. in the form of personalized medicine.
本文表明，下游市场的选择激励会扭曲上游价格。投入品的定价可能高于最终消费者对商品的价值。我们将这一思想应用于向存在选择问题的健康保险市场销售药品的制药公司。我们具体说明了以超过治疗价值的价格销售药品的条件。模型的另一个特点是存在过度的私人激励来缩小市场规模，例如以个性化医疗的形式。
