Long Feiteng, Ye Zi, Liu Guohua
Leiden University, The Netherlands.
Shanghai International Studies University, China.
Pers Soc Psychol Bull. 2025 Oct;51(10):1911-1926. doi: 10.1177/01461672241235381. Epub 2024 Mar 22.
It is well-documented that economic inequality can harm political stability and social cohesion. In six experiments (total = 1,907) conducted in China and the United Kingdom, we tested our primary hypothesis that high (vs. low) economic inequality leads to voters' reduced preferences for competent political leaders. Across studies, this prediction was consistently supported by experimental evidence, regardless of the voter's social status. We also found that high (vs. low) economic inequality indirectly diminished preferences for competent political leaders through heightened perceptions that politicians were less inclined to care about the populace in a highly (vs. lowly) unequal societal context. In essence, our findings underscore the idea that economic inequality curtails voters' preferences for competent political leaders by amplifying their concerns about politicians' indifference to the populace. It also stresses the need for policies and practices to address economic inequality and maintain the vitality of democracy.
有充分的文献记载表明,经济不平等会损害政治稳定和社会凝聚力。在中国和英国进行的六项实验(总计1907人)中,我们检验了我们的主要假设,即高度(相对于低度)的经济不平等会导致选民对有能力的政治领导人的偏好降低。在各项研究中,这一预测始终得到实验证据的支持,无论选民的社会地位如何。我们还发现,高度(相对于低度)的经济不平等通过增强人们的认知,即政治家在高度(相对于低度)不平等的社会背景下不太倾向于关心民众,从而间接削弱了对有能力的政治领导人的偏好。从本质上讲,我们的研究结果强调了这样一种观点,即经济不平等通过放大选民对政治家对民众冷漠的担忧,从而减少了他们对有能力的政治领导人的偏好。这也强调了制定政策和采取措施来解决经济不平等问题以及维护民主活力的必要性。