Business School, Huaqiao University, Quanzhou, Fujian, China.
School of Economics, Jinan University, Guangzhou, Guangdong, China.
PLoS One. 2024 Mar 28;19(3):e0300332. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0300332. eCollection 2024.
Taking Chinese non-financial A-share companies listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) between 2003 and 2018 as a sample, this paper empirically examines whether and how institutional investors' site visits (SVs) affect corporate investment-cash flow sensitivity (ICFS). The results show that institutional investors' SVs can reduce ICFS, and this effect is more obvious for companies with fewer investment opportunities, larger sizes, higher internal cash flows, and higher agency costs, indicating that institutional investors' SVs primarily inhibit ICFS caused by agency conflicts rather than financing constraints. In addition, the inhibitory effect of institutional investors' SVs on ICFS exists mainly in companies with poor internal supervision governance and weak executive compensation incentive mechanisms, indicating that institutional investors' SVs and other forms of corporate governance mechanisms operate as substitutes in reducing ICFS. This paper reveals the important role of institutional investors' SVs in reducing ICFS, with important theoretical and practical implications for regulators to progressively regulate and promote this form of investor activity.
本文以 2003-2018 年在深圳证券交易所上市的中国非金融 A 股公司为样本，实证检验了机构投资者调研（SVs）是否以及如何影响企业投资-现金流敏感性（ICFS）。结果表明，机构投资者的 SVs 可以降低 ICFS，对于投资机会较少、规模较大、内部现金流较高和代理成本较高的公司，这种效应更为明显，表明机构投资者的 SVs 主要抑制了代理冲突而非融资约束引起的 ICFS。此外，机构投资者 SVs 对 ICFS 的抑制作用主要存在于内部监督治理较差和高管薪酬激励机制较弱的公司，表明机构投资者 SVs 和其他形式的公司治理机制在降低 ICFS 方面具有替代作用。本文揭示了机构投资者 SVs 在降低 ICFS 方面的重要作用，对于监管机构逐步规范和促进这种投资者活动具有重要的理论和实践意义。
