School of Business Administration, Liaoning Technical University, Huludao, China.
College of Chemistry and Environment Engineering & Center of Instrument Analysis, YingKou Institute of Technology, Yingkou, China.
PLoS One. 2024 May 29;19(5):e0304368. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0304368. eCollection 2024.
There is a huge funding gap in the abandoned mines ecological restoration in China. It is of great research value to explore how PPP model can better introduce social capital into the low-profit ecological restoration of abandoned mines. Based on the innovation perspective of the central government's reward and punishment system, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of "local government-social capital", analyzes the interaction and behavior mechanism of core stakeholders in the operation process of abandoned mines ecological restoration PPP mode, and discusses the influence of evolutionary equilibrium strategy and parameters change on evolutionary strategy under different scenarios by Matlab simulation. The research shows that the abandoned mines ecological restoration needs the support of the central government. When the local government lightly punishes the low-quality service of social capital, the central government needs to pay higher costs to promote all parties to actively participate in the operation and supervision of the PPP project. The revenue and cost of government supervision, the operating subsidy for social capital and the cost saved by social capital in providing bad service are the key factors affecting the evolution of the game between government and social capital. Punishment can effectively spur social capital to keep the contract and operate in the project, but the punishment effect will be ineffective without government supervision. Finally, some suggestions are put forward, such as establishing a long-term supervision mechanism and a reasonable income mechanism for PPP projects, increasing penalties for violations, attracting third parties to reduce supervision costs and strengthening communication between the two parties, so as to make the project take into account the economic performance of social capital and the social welfare of government departments, and achieve dual Pareto improvement.
中国废弃矿山生态修复存在巨大的资金缺口。探索 PPP 模式如何更好地将社会资本引入废弃矿山低利润的生态修复中，具有很大的研究价值。本文基于中央政府奖惩制度的创新视角，构建了“地方政府-社会资本”的演化博弈模型，分析了废弃矿山生态修复 PPP 模式运作过程中核心利益相关者的互动行为机制，并通过 Matlab 仿真讨论了不同情景下演化均衡策略和参数变化对演化策略的影响。研究表明，废弃矿山生态修复需要中央政府的支持。当地方政府对社会资本的低质量服务从轻处罚时，中央政府需要付出更高的成本来推动各方积极参与 PPP 项目的运作和监管。政府监管的收益和成本、社会资本的运营补贴以及社会资本提供劣质服务所节省的成本是影响政府与社会资本之间博弈演化的关键因素。惩罚可以有效地促使社会资本遵守合同并在项目中运营，但如果没有政府监管，惩罚效果将无效。最后，提出了建立 PPP 项目的长期监管机制和合理收益机制、加大违规处罚力度、吸引第三方降低监管成本、加强双方沟通等建议，以使项目兼顾社会资本的经济效益和政府部门的社会效益，实现双重帕累托改进。
