Department of Electronic Business, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510006, China.
Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2023 Feb 27;20(5):4263. doi: 10.3390/ijerph20054263.
As the aging of Chinese society continues to deepen, it is particularly important for the development of the national elderly care service industry to further strengthen the government's supervision of private pension institutions and improve their management awareness of standardized operations. The strategic behaviors among the participants of senior care service regulation have not been well studied yet. In the process of senior care service regulation, there is a certain game association among three stakeholders, namely, government departments, private pension institutions, and the elderly. This paper firstly constructs an evolutionary game model including the above three subjects and analyzes the evolutionary path of strategic behaviors of each subject and the evolutionary stabilization strategy of the system. On this basis, the feasibility of the evolutionary stabilization strategy of the system is further verified through simulation experiments, and the effects of different initial conditions and key parameters on the evolutionary process and results are discussed. The research results show that (1) There are four ESSs in the pension service supervision system, and revenue is the decisive factor that affects the evolution of the stakeholders' strategy. (2) The final evolution result of the system is not necessarily related to the initial strategy value of each agent, but the size of the initial strategy value will affect the rate of each agent's evolution to a stable state. (3) The increase in the success rate of government regulation, subsidy coefficient and punishment coefficient, or the reduction in the cost of regulation and the fixed subsidy for the elderly can effectively promote the standardized operation of private pension institutions, but the large additional benefits will lead to their tendency to operate in violation of regulations. The research results can provide reference and a basis for government departments to formulate the regulation policy for elderly care institutions.
随着中国社会老龄化的不断加深，进一步加强政府对私人养老金机构的监管，提高其规范经营管理意识，对国家养老服务业的发展尤为重要。养老服务监管中各参与主体的策略行为尚未得到很好的研究。在养老服务监管过程中，政府部门、私人养老金机构和老年人这三个利益相关者之间存在一定的博弈关联。本文首先构建了一个包含上述三个主体的演化博弈模型，分析了各主体策略行为的演化路径和系统的演化稳定策略，并在此基础上通过仿真实验进一步验证了系统演化稳定策略的可行性，讨论了不同初始条件和关键参数对演化过程和结果的影响。研究结果表明：（1）养老金服务监管制度存在四个演化稳定策略，收益是影响利益相关者策略演化的决定性因素；（2）系统的最终演化结果不一定与各主体的初始策略值有关，但初始策略值的大小会影响各主体向稳定状态演化的速度；（3）政府监管成功率、补贴系数和惩罚系数的提高，或监管成本和老年人固定补贴的降低，都可以有效促进私人养老金机构的规范运作，但过高的附加收益会导致其违规经营的倾向。研究结果可为政府部门制定养老机构监管政策提供参考和依据。
