Fazli Davood, Khanjanianpak Mozhgan, Azimi-Tafreshi Nahid
Physics Department, Institute for Advanced Studies in Basic Sciences (IASBS), Zanjan, 45137-66736, Iran.
Pasargad Institute for Advanced Innovative Solutions (PIAIS), Tehran, 1991633357, Iran.
Sci Rep. 2024 Jun 23;14(1):14444. doi: 10.1038/s41598-024-65379-5.
Cascading failures, triggered by a local perturbation, can be catastrophic and cause irreparable damages in a wide area. Hence, blocking the devastating cascades is an important issue in real world networks. One of the ways to control the cascade is to use protective measures, so that the agents decide to be protected against failure. Here, we consider a coevolution of the linear threshold model for the spread of cascading failures and a decision-making game based on the perceived risk of failure. Protected agents are less vulnerable to failure and in return the size of the cascade affects the agent's decision to get insured. We find at what range of protection efficiency and cost of failure, the global cascades stop. Also we observe that in some range of protection efficiency, a bistable region emerges for the size of cascade and the prevalence of protected agents. Moreover, we show how savings or the ability of agents to repair can prevent cascades from occurring.
由局部扰动引发的级联故障可能具有灾难性，并会在广泛区域造成无法弥补的损害。因此，阻止破坏性的级联故障是现实世界网络中的一个重要问题。控制级联故障的方法之一是采取保护措施，以便各主体决定采取防范故障的保护措施。在此，我们考虑级联故障传播的线性阈值模型与基于感知故障风险的决策博弈的共同演化。受保护的主体对故障的脆弱性较低，作为回报，级联故障的规模会影响主体购买保险的决策。我们发现，在何种保护效率和故障成本范围内，全局级联故障会停止。此外，我们观察到，在一定的保护效率范围内，级联故障规模和受保护主体的比例会出现双稳态区域。而且，我们展示了储蓄或主体的修复能力如何能够防止级联故障的发生。
